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ABSTRACT 
Beneath the veil of our affluent, sexually permissive capitalist society, Herbert 
Marcuse identifies a deep-rooted contradiction concerning how sexuality is made to 
operate in this system. On his account, our current civilization is characterized by the 
wholesale incorporation, or "containment," of all dimensions of human life into a system 
that seeks to control and dominate individuals. With regards to sexuality in particular, 
Marcuse maintains that the increased liberalization of sexuality represents its effective 
containment within a system that reduces all human interests and activities to their 
market value and binds individuals to a market system structured to maximize profit and 
impoverish human experience. In the following thesis, I explore the development of 
Marcuse's thought on sexual repression under late capitalism and explicate the 
connections between his position and that of Sigmund Freud. 
iv 
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PROLOGUE 
The claim that sexuality has become increasingly liberalized over the past several 
decades in advanced industrial civilization is hardly controversial. Indeed, it would be 
virtually impossible to proceed through an ordinary day without confronting various 
images, advertisements, and products which make use of and appeal to sexuality. 
Television programs and commercials, billboards and magazines inform us how we 
might become more attractive, marketable, productive members of society and provide us 
with the means for completing our otherwise inadequate sexual image. Countless self-
help books prescribe various ways to appeal to potential partners and highlight the 
appropriate techniques with which to complete our sexual transactions. Considering the 
ubiquity of sexuality both in and outside of the work place, one might conclude that our 
libidinal drives have been emancipated from the repressive clutches of Puritanism and 
that the current social order has liberated sexuality to an unprecedented extent. 
Throughout much of his work, Herbert Marcuse takes this conclusion to task. In 
One-Dimensional Man, he remarks that "advanced industrial civilization operates with a 
greater degree of sexual freedom—'operates' in the sense that the latter becomes a 
market value and a factor of social mores."1 On his account, late capitalist society is 
characterized by the wholesale incorporation of all dimensions of human life into a 
system which seeks to control and dominate individuals in order to maximize profit for a 
relative few. Marcuse maintains that individuals actively contribute to the reproduction of 
Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1964) p. 74. 
8 
the capitalist system—the "affluent monster" —due to our instinctual identification with 
the comforts, commodities, and sexual horizons provided by the establishment. As such, 
he argues that the liberalization of sexuality within the repressive order of domination 
actually serves to perpetuate this very system. 
Throughout his work on the repression of sexuality under late capitalism, Marcuse 
proceeds from Sigmund Freud's metapsychology and late theory of "instincts," the 
"primary 'drives' of the human organism which are subject to historical modification."3 
In doing so, he attempts to provide rigorous psychological support for his critical theory 
of society. As we shall see throughout this essay, Marcuse employs many of Karl Marx's 
concepts and categories in order to extrapolate the historical and sociological 
implications of Freud's ambivalent critique of civilization along more resolutely socialist 
lines. 
This is not to suggest, however, that Marcuse attempts to 'add' a sociological or 
political dimension to Freudian theory. Unlike the Neo-Freudian schools, he wishes to 
reveal that "Freud's theory is in its very substance 'sociological,' and that no new cultural 
or sociological orientation is needed to reveal this substance."4 Furthermore, he is not 
attempting to improve psychoanalytic theory and practice. Rather, his task "is to 
contribute to the philosophy of psychoanalysis—not to psychoanalysis itself."5 On this 
basis, Marcuse levels a thoroughgoing critique of sexual repression under advanced 
industrial civilization and attempts to account for how and why individuals have 
2
 Idem, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) p. 7. 
3
 Idem, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955) p. 8. 
4Ibid., p. 5. 
5
 Ibid., p. 7. 
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increasingly come to identify—at the instinctual level—with a system that does not 
represent their interests. 
The task of this essay is to explore the development of Marcuse's thought on the 
historically specific forms of repression in advanced industrial civilization through a 
detailed explication of both psychoanalytic theory and Marcuse's critical appropriation of 
this theory. The essay will be divided into three relatively equal parts. In Chapter 1, I 
intend to trace the evolution of Freudian theory by offering a thorough explication of 
several key psychoanalytic concepts. To begin, I shall elucidate Freud's distinction 
between the "pleasure principle" and the "reality principle." Next, I shall highlight the 
clinical cases which lead Freud to posit the dualism of "life instincts" and "death 
instincts" and explain how this new instinctual dynamic alters his earlier theory. Finally, I 
will discuss Freud's notions of "repression" and "sublimation" and elucidate his reasons 
for suggesting that civilization depends upon the continuous renunciation and deflection 
of instinctual energy. 
Chapter 2 will focus on Marcuse's early interpretation and critical application of 
psychoanalytic theory in Eros and Civilization. In this chapter, I shall begin by 
explicating his historical extrapolation of Freud's basic concepts and explain the ways in 
which he employs these revised terms in order to indict the unnecessary modes of sexual 
repression in advanced industrial civilization. I will then consider his arguments for the 
historical and theoretical possibilities of reversing the excessive modes of instinctual 
restraint necessitated by the prevailing social order. 
In Chapter 3, I shall return to the contemporary context with which I began by 
considering Marcuse's argument that the current "liberalization" of sexuality represents 
10 
its effective incorporation within a more efficient system of control and domination. I 
shall highlight Marcuse's claim that the relaxation of sexual taboos, the incorporation of 
sexual expression and behaviour into the work place, and the mass dissemination of 
prescribed sexual horizons in the advertising and entertainment industries, bind 
individuals to a market system structured against the greater potentialities of human 
beings. These emerging trends reveal the repressive modes of "desublimation" in 
contemporary civilization, which replace lasting instinctual gratification with immediate 
libidinal satisfaction in a fundamentally unfree society. 
In Freudian terms, this essay might be thought of as a "sublimation" of instinctual 
and intellectual energy—a "transformation of passion" to the end of articulating certain 
ideas and arguments that are edifying and perhaps useful. According to Hans W. 
Loewald, sublimation is often thought of as a process by which the individual is able to 
"master" reality, "mastery conceived not as domination but as coming to terms—as it 
brings external and material reality within the compass of psychic reality, and psychic 
reality within the sweep of external reality."6 In this light, the present inquiry is intended 
to "master" the works of Freud and Marcuse by "coming to terms" with their crucial 
insights and elucidating the connections between these two thinkers. 
6
 Hans W. Loewald, Sublimation: Inquiries into Theoretical Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1988) p. 22. Loewald also characterizes his own work as an act of sublimation: "It is a sobering and 
strangely comforting thought that writing these investigations has been a sublimated way of cleaning and 
preening myself, like a cat after a meal, or after a frustrating hunt." Ibid., p. ix. 
11 
CHAPTER 1 
THE BILDUNGSMACHTE1 OF MARCUSE'S CRITICAL SEXUAL THEORY: 
SIGMUND FREUD 
A thorough explication of some of Freud's fundamental concepts is necessary in 
order to lay the groundwork for my treatment of Marcuse's work. In Section 1, I shall 
begin by elucidating Freud's distinction between the "pleasure principle" and the "reality 
principle," the "two principles of mental functioning" governing psychical life. These 
two principles are treated in relation to the conscious and unconscious dimensions of 
mental life and to the various functions of the ego. In Section 2, I will examine the 
emergence of the "life instincts" and the "death instincts" in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle before turning to Freud's discussion of aggressiveness as a manifestation of the 
death instincts in Civilization and Its Discontents. On the basis of this discussion of the 
inherent erotic and aggressive drives of human beings, Section 3 will focus on the notion 
of "repression" at both the individual (psychical) and social levels. Finally, in Section 4 I 
shall briefly explicate Freud's concept of "sublimation," which is arguably one of the 
most important and at the same time enigmatic terms in Freudian theory. 
Throughout this chapter, I will offer a fairly standard interpretation of Freud's 
crucial concepts without relying too heavily upon Marcuse's own characterization of 
psychoanalytic theory. I should mention, however, that Freud's notions of pleasure and 
7
 When asked to describe the significance of Freud for the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer answered: 
"We really are deeply indebted to Freud and his first collaborators. His thought is one of the 
Bildungsmachte [foundation stones] without which our own philosophy would not be what it is." Cited in 
Joel Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1995) p. 1. 
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reality, life and death, repression and sublimation do not comprise a systematic whole; he 
often relies upon hypothesis, speculation, and conjecture in order to account for certain 
trends in individual mentation and behaviour that could not be explained using any 
existing psychological categories. Considering the complexity of the Freudian project and 
the many alterations it has undergone since Freud's writings, my discussion of these key 
psychoanalytic concepts will be selective and incomplete. 
Furthermore, in order to trace the development of these concepts and dualisms 
thematically, many of Freud's related concepts—narcissism, Oedipus complex, superego, 
etc.—will recur and develop in each section. I ask the reader to forgive these unavoidable 
repetitions. The point of this chapter is to lay the Freudian groundwork from which 
Marcuse proceeds, striving at all times for the utmost thematic and systematic unity even 
where the subject matter is not wholly amenable to such treatment. 
SECTION 1: PLEASURE AND REALITY 
In his essay "On Narcissism," Freud argues that the mental apparatus is "first and 
foremost a device designed for mastering excitations which would otherwise be felt as 
distressing or would have pathogenic effects." The individual's mental organization is 
thus structured to decrease the amount of unpleasurable tensions in the psychical 
apparatus and to press towards the pleasurable release, or "discharge," of instinctual 
impulses. First and foremost, then, the mental apparatus is governed by the "pleasure 
principle." Throughout his work on this "principle of mental functioning," Freud equates 
8
 Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, tr. James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957) p. 85. 
13 
the pleasure principle with the hypothesis of constancy. In Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Freud argues that "the mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of 
excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant."10 Accordingly, 
Freud claims that the psychical structure of the individual seeks to maintain a level of 
stability which can only be ensured by decreasing the quantity of mental excitations, or at 
least by keeping them constant. 
Under the influence of external pressures and demands, however, a new principle 
of mental functioning emerges in order to safeguard the demands of the pleasure 
principle and to ensure that the organism does not destroy itself in its relentless pursuit of 
immediate gratification. This "reality principle" does not abandon the drive towards 
instinctual gratification and the lowering of mental excitations. Rather, it "demands and 
carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of 
possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step 
on the long indirect road to pleasure."11 In this sense, then, the pleasure principle must be 
superseded by the reality principle in order to secure lasting instinctual gratification under 
the often constraining limitations of the external world. 
As Marcuse argues in Eros and Civilization, the distinction between the pleasure 
principle and the reality principle "corresponds largely (but not entirely) to the distinction 
between unconscious and conscious processes." On Freud's view, the pleasure principle 
9
 Freud characterizes the principle of constancy thus: "the nervous system is an apparatus which has the 
function of getting rid of the stimuli that reach it, or of reducing them to the lowest possible level; or which, 
if it were feasible, would maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition." See "Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, tr. 
James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957) p. 120. 
10
 Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, tr. James Strachey, (New York: Liverlight, 1961) p. 1-2. 
11
 Ibid., p. 4. 
12
 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 12. 
14 
corresponds to the unconscious, or the "primary processes," while the reality principle is 
bound up with consciousness, or the "secondary processes." In his "Formulations on the 
Two Principles of Mental Functioning," Freud explains this connection between the 
pleasure principle and unconscious processes when he claims that the "governing purpose 
obeyed by these primary processes is easy to recognize; it is described as the pleasure-
unpleasure [Lust-Unlust] principle, or more shortly the pleasure principle....Our dreams 
at night and our waking tendency to tear ourselves away from distressing impressions are 
remnants of the dominance of this principle and proofs of its power."13 The goal of these 
unconscious processes is to break through the barrier that separates them from 
consciousness in order to release unpleasurable tensions through a discharge of 
instinctual impulses. These processes—represented, in part, by the id—are timeless in the 
sense that they "are not ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way 
and that the idea of time cannot be applied to them."14 The id operates solely in 
accordance with "the demands of the pleasure-unpleasure regulation."15 
While the pleasure principle governs the unconscious realm of the psychical 
apparatus, or the primary process, Paul Ricoeur reminds us that "in general, reality is the 
correlate of the function of consciousness." While the unconscious processes attempt to 
"cathect" certain instinctual demands, ideas, and wishes—that is, to charge these 
"ideational representatives" of instinct with a store of instinctual energy to achieve 
13
 Freud, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 12, tr. James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1958) pp. 218-219. 
14
 Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 22. 
15
 Idem, "The Unconscious," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. 14, tr. James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957) p. 187. 
16
 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, tr. Denis Savage, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970) p. 261. 
15 
discharge—the preconscious and conscious systems attempt to prevent these libidinal 
cathexes from invading consciousness and potentially destroying the organism. When 
faced with the pressures of external reality, the mature ego develops out of the id in order 
to meet the demands of the outside world and to prevent the id from recklessly pursuing 
its discharge of unpleasurable tensions. This process of identifying the demands of the 
external world and attempting to achieve lasting gratification under these conditions 
involves "reality-testing," which the id effectively ignores in its pursuit of immediate 
gratification. The ego repels the id's attempts at libidinal invasion by establishing 
"anticathexes," by which it continuously prevents certain ideas and wishes from entering 
consciousness and achieving discharge. 
What has been put forth thus far remains within the framework of Freud's early 
libido theory, in which he distinguishes between the sexual instincts and the ego-
instincts.17 The ego-instincts are the drives towards self-preservation; they uphold the 
reality principle in order to secure lasting instinctual gratification without destroying the 
individual.18 By contrast, the sexual instincts, which constitute the "libido" proper, seek 
gratification through "object-cathexis," or by channeling instinctual impulses towards 
objects in the external world.19 However, Freud explains that the sexual instincts "behave 
auto-erotically at first; they obtain their satisfaction in the subject's own body and 
therefore do not find themselves in the situation of frustration which was what 
17
 As we shall see in the next section, this opposition is complicated by the introduction of narcissism and 
the "compulsion to repeat," at which point Freud distinguishes between the life instincts and the death 
instincts, Eros and Thanatos. 
18
 It should be noted here that the "ego-instincts," like the sexual instincts, refer to a group of instinctual 
drives rather than one overarching drive: "Freud introduced the term 'ego-instincts' and identified these on 
the one hand with the self-preservative instincts and on the other with the repressive function." See the 
editor's introduction to "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," p. 115. 
19
 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 54. 
16 
necessitated the institution of the reality principle." As a result, the sexual instinct "is 
held up in its psychical development and remains far longer under the dominance of the 
pleasure principle, from which in many people it is never able to withdraw."20 
Just as Plato acknowledges that the majority of the population in the republic 
would be unable to overcome their appetitive drives, Freud argues that the sexual 
instincts are difficult to "educate" and that the majority of individuals remain largely 
under their sway. Even in those individuals who have established sufficient mastery over 
their desires, the sexual instincts retain their dominant role in "phantasy" and in dreams. 
These insights support our earlier observation that the pleasure principle corresponds to 
unconscious mental processes while the reality principle is the correlate of consciousness. 
At this point, we can draw a further connection between "the sexual instinct and phantasy 
and, on the other hand, between the ego-instincts and the activities of consciousness."21 
Although the ego-instincts are associated with "the activities of consciousness," 
Freud reminds us that the ego is merely an offshoot of the id and that "much of the ego is 
• • 99 • • • 
itself unconscious." It is by virtue of its partially unconscious character that the ego can 
be said to have its own instincts. The dual function of the ego is thus made explicit: in 
one respect, the ego seeks to satisfy the instinctual demands of the id of which it is 
merely an outgrowth; in another respect, the ego detaches itself from the internal world of 
the id, represents the demands of the reality principle, and carries out the satisfaction of 
its now separate self-preservative instincts. Freud establishes this dual function of the ego 
by distinguishing between the pleasure-ego and the reality-ego: "[j]ust as the pleasure-
20
 Idem, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," p. 222. 
21
 Ibid., p. 222. 
22
 Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 13. 
17 
ego can do nothing but wish, work for a yield of pleasure, and avoid unpleasure, so the 
reality-ego need do nothing but strive for what is useful and guard itself against 
damage." In order for the reality principle to supersede the pleasure principle, the 
pleasure-ego must be transformed into the reality-ego. 
Alongside this transformation of the mental apparatus, Freud argues that "the 
sexual instincts undergo the changes that lead them from their original auto-eroticism 
through various intermediate phases to object-love in the service of procreation."24 This 
sublation of the pleasure principle by the reality principle—of the pleasure-ego by the 
reality-ego—does not imply that the pleasure principle is completely abandoned. Rather, 
Freud makes it quite clear that this substitution "implies no deposing of the pleasure 
principle, but only a safeguarding of it. A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is 
given up, but only in order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later 
time."25 
While the psychical apparatus tends to progress from auto-eroticism to "object-
love in the service of procreation," Freud identifies certain clinical cases in which 
individuals do not seek instinctual gratification through object-cathexis. Instead, these 
individuals withdraw their libidinal interest from the external world and direct it toward 
their own ego, a phenomenon which Freud labels "narcissism." At the earliest stages of 
psychosexual development, the individual "has originally two sexual objects—himself 
and the woman who nurses him." At these stages, the child is "polymorphous perverse" 
in the sense that he is able to achieve gratification through several "zones" of his own 
23
 Idem, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," p. 223. 
24
 Ibid., p. 224. 
25
 Ibid., p. 223. 
18 
body and does not yet rely exclusively upon object-cathexes in order to obtain pleasure. 
Furthermore, at these stages the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts are virtually 
indistinguishable in that the child satisfies the demands of both sexual gratification and 
self-preservation through the mother's breast, from which the child has not yet fully 
separated himself. In this regard, Freud postulates "a primary narcissism in everyone, 
which may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his object-choice."27 
After the trials of the Oedipal conflict, the child must direct the libido toward the 
external world and seek instinctual satisfaction through various objects. However, some 
individuals find the demands of the reality principle, and the inevitable delays in 
gratification it necessitates, too difficult to bear and retain their libido in their own ego. 
Citing Ferenczi, Freud considers the case of an individual "who is tormented by organic 
pain and discomfort [and] gives up his interest in the things of the external world." This 
"sick man withdraws his libidinal cathexes back upon his own ego, and sends them out 
T O 
again when he recovers." Freud labels this temporary withdrawal of libido from the 
external world "secondary narcissism," which denotes "the attitude of a person who treats 
his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily 
treated." This "narcissistic withdrawal," which also occurs in the non-pathogenic cases 
of sleep and dreams, marks an individual's rejection of the harsh demands of the reality 
principle. 
For a more complete discussion of the undifferentiated unity of mother and child, see Loewald's 
discussion of the "infant-mother matrix" in Sublimation, chapters 2 and 3. 
27
 Freud, "On Narcissism," p. 88. 
28
 Ibid., p. 82. 
29Ibid.,p. 73. 
19 
As Marcuse claims in Eros and Civilization, "the discovery of primary narcissism 
meant more than the addition of just another phase to the development of the libido." 
Indeed, Marcuse finds in primary narcissism "the archetype of another existential relation 
to reality."30 Although we will have occasion to consider Marcuse's view of primary 
narcissism in the next chapter, it is necessary here to highlight two crucial alterations of 
Freudian theory necessitated by this concept. First, Freud's discussion of narcissism 
challenges the initial dualism of the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts by revealing 
that the ego also contains libido. In "Anxiety and Instinctual Life," Freud claims that the 
case of narcissism reveals that "the ego is always the main reservoir of libido, from which 
libidinal cathexes of objects go out and into which they return again, while the major part 
of this libido remains permanently in the ego." In this regard, "ego libido is being 
T 1 
constantly changed into object libido and object libido into ego libido." These claims 
challenge Freud's earlier view that the ego-instincts strive exclusively for the self-
preservation of the organism and that the sexual instincts constitute the "libido" proper. 
Furthermore, the clinical observations of narcissism challenge Freud's first 
topography of the mental apparatus, in which he divides the psychical structure into 
unconscious, preconscious, and conscious domains. The narcissistic withdrawal from the 
demands of the external world involves the establishment of an ego-ideal, "by which [the 
individual] measures his actual ego."32 The ego-ideal emerges after the trials of the 
Oedipus complex, at which time the child abandons the mother as a possible object of 
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 168. 
31
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sexual gratification, identifies with the father, and "internalizes" his paternal authority. 
This early discussion of the ego-ideal provides the theoretical foundation for what Freud 
will later call the "superego" in The Ego and the Id. As we shall see in the next section, 
these complications surrounding narcissism clear the way for Freud's second topography 
of psychical life (id, ego, superego) and the new dualism of the life instincts and the death 
instincts. 
SECTION 2: LIFE AND DEATH 
Throughout his "Papers on Metapsychology," Freud maintains his distinction 
between the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts and reiterates his view that the mental 
apparatus is initially governed by the pleasure principle. As we have seen, however, the 
introduction of narcissism complicates Freud's strict disarticulation of ego-instincts and 
sexual instincts by revealing that the ego is the main "reservoir of libido"—that the ego-
instincts, too, are libidinal in character. In Instincts and their Vicissitudes, Freud claims 
that the distinction between the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts "is merely a 
working hypothesis, to be retained only so long as it proves useful, and it will make little 
difference to the results of our work of description and classification if it is replaced by 
another."33 It is not until 1920 that Freud finds occasion to "replace" his early libido 
theory on the basis of clinical cases that challenge the dominance of the pleasure 
principle. 
Idem, "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," p. 124. 
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In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud claims that the task of psychoanalysis is 
to communicate to the patient certain ideas and experiences that he or she has repressed 
and to "oblige the patient to confirm the analyst's construction from his own memory."34 
In doing so, the patient is able to come to terms with the repressed desires and traumatic 
experiences that have resulted in neuroses. However, Freud considers the case of 
individuals who are unable to corroborate the analyst's interpretation and thus fail to 
recognize the unconscious repressed material as belonging to past experiences of failure 
and distress. Accordingly, these individuals are "obliged to repeat the repressed material 
as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to see, 
remembering it as something belonging to the past."35 In short, such individuals are 
compelled to bring about the same childhood experiences of frustration that occurred 
during the Oedipus complex. 
Although the ego's resistance to remembering experiences of distress can be 
attributed, in part, to the pleasure principle—since the ego "seeks to avoid the unpleasure 
which would be produced by the liberation of the repressed"36—the compulsion to repeat 
these distressing situations causes more unpleasure than if they had emerged as memories 
or dreams.37 The patient is compelled to relive "experiences which include no possibility 
T O 
of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction." While 
Freud observes these tendencies most readily in those suffering from neurosis, he claims 
that such tendencies can also be observed in "normal" individuals. As Ricoeur explains, 
Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 12. 
Ibid.,p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 14. 
Ibid,p. 15. 
Ibid., p. 14. 
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the compulsion to repeat is "further evidenced in the strange fate of those persons who 
seem to call down upon themselves the same misfortunes time and again."39 On the basis 
of these observations, Freud believes that he has found tendencies that are "more 
primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure principle."40 
Freud attempts to account for these tendencies by describing consciousness as a 
protective barrier erected against the influx of external stimuli. He claims that what 
"consciousness yields consists essentially of perceptions of excitations coming from the 
external world and of feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which can only arise from 
within the mental apparatus."41 External stimuli thus penetrate into the psychical 
apparatus from without and, in turn, the individual experiences either pleasure or 
unpleasure. 
To this notion of consciousness as a "shield" separating the unconscious from the 
external world, Freud relates Breuer's distinction between "bound" and "freely mobile" 
cathexis. Whereas freely mobile cathexis can charge certain ideas or desires with 
instinctual energy for immediate discharge, bound cathexis is that instinctual energy 
which the ego has mastered and controlled. 2 The task of consciousness qua protective 
shield against stimuli is to "bind" the energy that penetrates the system from without so 
as to control it and regulate the discharge of instinctual impulses. This barrier takes the 
form of "anxiety," the state of expecting or preparing for danger, in order to prepare the 
mental apparatus to bind external stimuli. 
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 287. 
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In the case of those individuals who compulsively repeat traumatic experiences 
from early childhood, Freud argues that the protective barrier against stimuli was initially 
unable to bind the influx of energy coming from outside. Indeed, traumatic experiences 
are defined precisely as those "excitations from outside which are powerful enough to 
break through the protective shield."43 hi these early traumatic situations, the protective 
barrier is temporarily put out of action, anxiety is not aroused to respond to the influx of 
energy, and the mental apparatus is flooded with unmanageable amounts of stimuli. 
Those individuals who repeat traumatic situations as fresh experiences, as well as those 
"normal" individuals who continuously repeat their mistakes, are thus "endeavouring to 
master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the 
cause of the traumatic neurosis."44 On this basis, Freud argues that the task of binding the 
energy that flows into the apparatus is "prior to the aim of gaining pleasure and avoiding 
unpleasure." 5 
This discussion of the compulsion to repeat culminates in a pivotal question, 
namely, "how is the predicate of being 'instinctual' related to the compulsion to repeat?" 
Freud claims that he has arrived at a universal attribute of instincts: "an instinct is an 
urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity 
has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces."46 This 
newly discovered attribute of instinctual life highlights the conservative nature of the 
drives, the "inertia inherent in organic life." With the coming to life of inanimate matter, 
Ibid., p. 23. 
Ibid., p. 26. 
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the instincts propel the organism toward a state of rest that is free of unpleasurable 
excitations—the state of nirvana. Accordingly, rather than arguing that death is caused by 
forces external to the individual, Freud claims that the human organism proceeds towards 
death for internal, instinctual reasons. On this reading, the self-preservative instincts are 
conservative in the sense that they sustain life on the long, circuitous path toward death; 
at most, they ensure that the organism dies "in its own fashion." 7 The sexual instincts are 
also conservative in that they are "peculiarly resistant to external influences," and "in that 
they preserve life itself for a comparatively long period."48 Ultimately, both the sexual 
instincts and the ego-instincts attempt to lead the organism back to an earlier state. 
It is on the basis of the conservative nature of the drives that the death instinct 
emerges. Initially, Freud is tempted to equate the ego-instincts with the death instinct, 
since "they arise from the coming to life of inanimate matter and seek to restore the 
inanimate state."49 In contradistinction to these instincts, Freud claims that the sexual 
instincts are the great exception to the organism's inherent movement towards death. He 
argues that the sexual instincts seek to "combine organic substances into ever larger 
unities" through the coalescence of two germ cells.50 In this regard, the sexual instincts 
"operate against the purpose of the other instincts, which leads, by reason of their 
function, to death."5 
Recalling his earlier arguments surrounding narcissism, however, Freud 
withdraws his view that the ego-instincts function simply to bring about death. Since the 
*'Ibid.,p. 33. 
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object-libido of the sexual instincts returns to the ego in narcissism, and since the ego is 
formed and matures on the basis of this return of libido into the ego,52 the ego is 
considered the main reservoir of libido. Insofar as both the ego-instincts and the sexual 
instincts are libidinal in character, then, Freud subsumes them under the label "Eros" and 
opposes them to the death instincts. 
In The Ego and the Id, Freud claims that both the life instincts and the death 
instincts are "active in every particle of living substance, though in unequal 
proportions." In other words, Eros and Thanatos are almost inevitably "alloyed" in 
every human drive, each attempting to gain dominance over the other. In opposition to 
the death instincts, Eros seeks to bring about "a more and more far-reaching combination 
of the particles into which living substance is dispersed," and "aims at complicating life 
and at the same time, of course, at preserving it."54 With this continuous struggle between 
life and death, the early libido theory is thus transformed into the new dualism of Eros 
and Thanatos. 
As I argued in the previous section, the introduction of narcissism also brought 
with it the concept of the "ego-ideal," or the superego. We recall that the superego is a 
direct result of the Oedipus complex, in which the individual identifies with the father's 
authority and establishes a moral tribunal against which he measures his own ego. By 
virtue of its genesis in the Oedipus complex, this "superego" contains both erotic and 
Freud explains that "the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it 
contains the history of those object-choices. It must, of course, be admitted from the outset that there are 
varying degrees of capacity for resistance, which decide the extent to which a person's character fends off 
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aggressive components. On the one hand, as Marcuse explains, "the superego builds up 
and protects the unity of the ego, secures its development under the reality principle, and 
thus works in the service of Eros."55 hi this sense, the superego takes on the protective 
role of the father and sustains the ego in the face of external pressures. 
On the other hand, the superego also takes on the father's punitive and aggressive 
qualities. Freud argues that the ego manages the destructive rage of the superego by 
directing it "towards the external world in the form of aggression."56 The paradigmatic 
example here is sadism, in which the individual deflects her aggressiveness towards other 
individuals. The case of sadism is significant in that it reveals the extent to which Eros 
and the death instincts are "alloyed" with one another in every human drive. In one 
respect, sadism is driven by the death instincts insofar as it involves harming individuals 
and objects in the outside world. Yet this outwardly directed destructiveness also 
prevents the ego from turning its aggression back upon itself; sadism is thus, in part, 
"pressed into the service of Eros, inasmuch as the organism [destroys] other things, both 
animate and inanimate, instead of itself." This example supports Freud's view that the 
manifestations of the life instincts are readily observable, whereas the death instincts are 
largely a "mute" energy which can only be deciphered through their activities with 
Eros.58 
Often times, however, the superego directs its aggression against the ego and 
"thus works in the service of the antagonist of the life instinct."59 Freud argues that "the 
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more a man checks his aggressiveness towards the exterior the more severe—that is 
aggressive—he becomes in his ego ideal."6 The individual must either channel her 
destructive energy towards the outside world or retain this aggression within herself at 
the risk of self-torment and death. When the death instincts are directed towards the ego, 
tension is created between the weakened ego and the ego-ideal. The superego establishes 
the "conscience," which continuously reprimands the ego. Freud argues that the superego 
is thus charged with destructive rage after the Oedipus complex and, in the extreme case 
of melancholia, is permeated with "a pure culture of the death instinct."61 
According to Ricoeur, the connection between the superego and the death 
instincts in The Ego and the Id provides the foundation for Freud's "metacultural" theory 
of Eros and Thanatos. Initially, Freud claims that the development and maintenance of 
civilization is the work of Eros. Insofar as the life instincts bind individuals into ever-
wider groups by creating strong libidinal ties between them, civilization is sustained and 
enriched through the efforts of the life instincts. As Ricoeur aptly asserts: "[cjultural 
development, like the growth of the individual from infancy to adulthood, is the fruit of 
Eros and Ananke, of love and work."62 Thus, civilization is founded upon the necessity of 
shared work and the power of Eros to bind individuals into tightly knit groups. 
Although the development of civilization is largely the work of Eros, Freud also 
emphasizes that the sexual instincts, "the part of Eros which is directed towards 
objects,"6 cannot achieve complete fulfillment if society is to function most efficiently. 
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Left to their own devices, the sexual instincts would drive the organism towards radically 
individualistic modes of immediate gratification, which could undermine progress and 
potentially dissolve the libidinal bonds of civilization. Private satisfaction and fulfillment 
must be subordinated to the advancement of society as a whole—"[individual liberty is 
not an asset of civilization."64 Therefore, the sexual instincts too must be restrained if 
civilization is to function optimally. 
On the basis of his earlier conjectures concerning the death instinct, Freud claims 
that the work of Eros is now counteracted by an "anti-cultural" instinct. He argues that 
"human beings are not gentle creatures in need of love, at most able to defend themselves 
if attacked; on the contrary, they can account a powerful share of aggression among their 
instinctual endowments."65 The death instinct thus finds its principal representative in 
"the hostility of each against all and all against each,"66 which civilization must control in 
various ways. Ideally, the life instincts are able to neutralize the death instincts by 
"fusing" them with erotic components and pressing them into the service of Eros. 
However, the demands of civilization force the individual to forego instinctual 
gratification and thus prevent Eros from binding the death instincts. At this point, then, it 
is necessary to explicate the ways in which the instincts are controlled at both the 
individual and societal levels by briefly explicating the processes of repression and 
sublimation. 
Idem, Civilization audits Discontents, p. 42. 
Ibid., p. 60. 
Ibid., p. 74. 
29 
SECTION 3: REPRESSION 
As I have argued, the task of the unconscious is to "cathect" certain ideas, desires, 
and instinctual impulses in order to discharge any unpleasurable excitations within the 
psychical apparatus. The task of the preconscious—which lies between the unconscious 
and conscious systems and regulates their interactions—is to establish "anti-cathexes" in 
order to resist the instinctual energy of the id and to prevent certain unconscious impulses 
from achieving discharge. Freud refers to this process of rejecting instinctual demands 
and preventing them from entering consciousness as "repression." According to Freud, 
"the process of repression lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which 
represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious."67 hi his later work, 
Freud claims that it is not the instincts themselves that are repressed—since an "instinct 
can never become an object of consciousness"—but the ideas or impulses which 
represent the instinct. When such an ideational representative of instinct proves to be 
incompatible with the reality principle, this idea meets with resistances and remain in an 
unconscious state. Ultimately, Freud claims that "the essence of repression lies simply in 
turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious.'''' 
Idem, "The Unconscious," p. 166. 
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In The Ego and the Id, Freud elucidates this process of repression in terms of his 
second topography of ego, id, and superego. As we recall, the ego is merely an offshoot 
of the id which emerges in response to the demands of external reality; it consists of both 
unconscious and conscious elements. According to Freud, "the ego seeks to bring the 
influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to 
substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestricted in the 
id."70 When the id makes an instinctual demand on the ego, the ego will either satisfy this 
demand by allowing the impulse to achieve discharge or repress the impulse in order to 
avoid any danger that might arise from its satisfaction. In this regard, the ego represses 
certain instinctual demands due to "external" obstacles and dangers in the outside world. 
In another respect, Freud argues that the ego carries out repressions for "internal" 
reasons. It will be recalled that after the Oedipus complex the child internalizes his 
father's authority through the formation of the superego. Since paternal authority 
represents the greatest obstacle to the satisfaction of Oedipal desires, "the ego fortified 
itself for the carrying out of the repression by erecting this same obstacle within itself." 
This internal "standard" by which the ego measures itself influences the repressions that 
the ego exacts upon the id. As Freud claims in Civilization and Its Discontents, the 
"tension between the stern super-ego and the ego that is subject to it is what we call a 
'sense of guilt'; this manifests itself as a need for punishment."72 In order to avoid the 
experience of guilt, the ego is forced to carry out certain repressions at the behest of its 
Idem, The Ego and the Id, p. 15. 
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superego. As such, the ego carries out repressions in order to avoid both external harm 
and internal punishment.73 
Despite the individual's efforts to repress certain impulses, Freud makes it clear 
that the process of repression does not destroy the idea that represents an instinct. Indeed, 
he claims that "the repressed exercises a continuous pressure in the direction of the 
conscious, so that this pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure."74 
Freud enumerates several ways in which the repressed can penetrate into consciousness. 
First, the repressed can surface when "the strength of counter-cathexis is diminished by 
an illness which acts on the Ego." In this instance, the weakness of the ego prevents it 
from opposing an instinctual demand, thus enabling the impulse to reach consciousness 
and produce symptoms. This process also occurs in non-pathogenic forms in dreams and 
phantasy. Second, the repressed can discharge its cathexis when "those instincts attached 
to the repressed material become strengthened." This often occurs during the process of 
puberty when the instincts—particularly the sexual instincts—become intensified. 
Finally, Freud claims that the repressed can emerge when "recent events produce 
impressions or experiences which are so much like the repressed material that they have 
the power to awaken it."75 As I will argue in the next chapter, Marcuse believes that this 
process of unearthing repressed impulses proves that the demands of the pleasure 
principle and the repressed desire for freedom can reawaken through the work of 
memory, imagination, and phantasy. 
These "conscious and unconscious," "external and internal" modes of repression that Freud describes 
will serve to justify Marcuse's broad definition of repression in Eros and Civilization. 
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Freud discusses the "return of the repressed" at the phylogenetic level in relation 
to his hypothesis of the primal crime. He claims that during the earliest phases of human 
history—which he does not specify—human beings lived in hordes controlled and 
regulated by a dominant male. The "strong male was the master and father of the whole 
horde, unlimited in his power, which he used brutally."76 This "father" took possession of 
the women and demanded the instinctual renunciation of the sons. If these sons "excited 
the father's jealousy" by failing to check their appetitive drives, they were either "killed 
or castrated or driven out." Spurred by their desire for freedom from the father, the ex-
communicated "brothers" came together, killed the father, and consumed his body. 
Although the brothers initially fought amongst themselves to assume the father's 
authority, they came to realize the futility of these disputes and established "a sort of 
77 
social contract." Thus, they established the first form of social organization, 
"accompanied by renunciation of instinctual gratification; recognition of mutual 
obligations; institutions declared sacred, which could not be broken—in short, the 
beginnings of morality and law."78 
While the brothers carried out their desire for liberation by killing the father and 
establishing social order, Freud claims that the sons experienced guilt over the primal 
crime. Although the sons hated the father for demanding instinctual renunciation, the 
father also provided for and sustained the entire clan and thus served as an example to be 
revered.79 Later on, the sons would find a substitute for the father in the form of a totem 
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animal. This animal reflected the sons' ambivalence towards the father: on the one hand, 
the totem animal was "the corporeal ancestor and protecting spirit of the clan," which 
they honoured and respected; on the other hand, the sons created a festival where the 
animal would be killed and eaten, thus reaffirming the murder of the father.80 The sons' 
guilt resulted from both the killing of the father who sustained them and his reappearance 
in the totem animal, which represents their failure to overcome him in the end. In order to 
eliminate their guilt over killing the master, the sons ultimately abandoned their project of 
liberation by deifying the father and re-instituting his restrictions on instinctual 
gratification.81 
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud explicates the cultural modes of 
repression and guilt-feeling in a way that mirrors the establishment of social order after 
the primal horde. We recall that, for Freud, unrestrained satisfaction of the drives would 
lead to purely individualistic modes of gratification and dissolve the bonds of civilization. 
Accordingly, civilization demands the renunciation of pleasure in order to preserve 
itself—it requires the subordination of the pleasure principle to the reality principle. 
According to Freud, "[cjommunal life becomes possible only when a majority comes 
together that is stronger than any individual and presents a unified front against every 
individual."82 Just as the brother clan banded together against the tyranny of the father, so 
too must the civilized community pit itself "against the power of the individual." The 
mIbid.,p. 104. 
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human community thus requires each individual to forego his or her desire for immediate 
instinctual gratification "by suppression, repression or some other means."83 
Yet Freud reminds us that the frustration of an instinctual demand cannot occur 
without risk. By preventing the instincts from achieving full gratification, civilization 
weakens the power of Eros to neutralize the destructive energies of the death instincts. 
Recalling his earlier argument that Eros and Thanatos are alloyed with one another in 
every human drive, Freud claims that "when a drive is repressed, its libidinal elements 
are converted into symptoms and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt." 
Elaborating upon his earlier arguments in The Ego and the Id, Freud now maintains that 
civilization imposes guilt upon the individual in order to prevent the death instincts from 
destroying the libidinal bonds upon which civilization depends. In this regard, "guilt is 
now seen as the instrument which culture uses, no longer against the libido, but against 
aggressiveness." The superego is thus reinterpreted on the cultural plane; civilization 
counters the aggressiveness of the individual "by weakening him, disarming him and 
setting up an internal authority to watch over him, like a garrison in a conquered town." 
By continuously reproducing the sense of guilt, civilization ensures that individuals will 
"freely" repress their drives for instinctual gratification, which, in turn, contributes to the 
"discontents" of civilization. 
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SECTION 4: SUBLIMATION 
As we have seen, repression is a continuous process by which certain instinctual 
impulses are denied discharge through the establishment of anti-cathectic barriers. Since 
this process deprives the instincts of gratification, Freud emphasizes that repression 
cannot occur without offering compromise satisfactions, lest it lead to mental illness and 
widespread "discontent." Accordingly, we turn now to Freud's notion of sublimation, the 
other principal "vicissitude" of the instincts which shapes human desire and provides 
satisfaction by diverting a drive towards non-sexual aims and objects. Unlike the other 
concepts and dualisms I have elucidated thus far, sublimation has not undergone a 
smooth and identifiable development in Freud's theory—or, perhaps more appropriately, 
its development has not been as clear as the other concepts. As such, I shall limit myself 
to a few key characteristics and examples of sublimation in order to lay the foundation 
for Marcuse's critical application of this term. 
In Instincts and their Vicissitudes, Freud claims that the sexual instincts can be 
distinguished from the ego-instincts "by possessing the capacity to act vicariously for one 
another to a wide extent and by being able to change their objects readily." As such, he 
argues that the sexual instincts are "capable of functions which are far removed from 
their original purposive actions—capable, that is, of 'sublimation.'"87 While the ego's 
instincts of self-preservation express themselves as needs which must be fulfilled in order 
to ensure the survival of the organism, the sexual instincts are more "flexible" in that they 
are able to find various objects of satisfaction. Far from 'damming up' an instinctual 
Idem, "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," p. 126. 
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impulse by establishing anti-cathectic barriers and rendering it unconscious, as is the case 
in repression, sublimation "neutralizes" the sexual energy of an instinctual impulse and 
go 
'channels' it "towards higher aims which are no longer sexual." Although this delay in 
gratification lacks the intensity and pleasure of an immediate discharge, and thus involves 
a temporary toleration of unpleasure, Freud argues that sublimation is merely a diversion 
of instinctual strivings in accordance with the reality principle. 
As I have argued above, the introduction of narcissism reveals that the ego is the 
main reservoir of libido. In the case of secondary narcissism, object-cathexes are sent 
back into the ego and the libidinal energy is converted into "ego-libido." In turn, Freud 
argues, this narcissistic store of libido can be sent back out to the external world in order 
to discharge its cathexis toward various objects. In The Ego and the Id, Freud explains 
this conversion of object-libido into ego-libido as a type of sublimation. He argues that 
this "transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido which thus takes place 
obviously implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualization—a kind of 
sublimation, therefore."89 In other words, the directly sexual strivings of object-libido are 
neutralized, freeing up a portion of libido to be diverted along other paths to gratification. 
Although this process involves the "displacement" of narcissistic libido towards non-
sexual aims, Freud claims that this neutral energy, while being desexualized, "would still 
retain the main purpose of Eros—that of uniting and binding—in so far as it helps 
towards establishing the unity, or tendency to unity, which is particularly characteristic of 
Idem, "On Psychoanalysis," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works ofSigmund 
Freud, Vol. 12, tr. James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1958) p. 209. 
89
 Idem, The Ego and the Id, p. 20. 
37 
the ego." Thus, Freud describes the neutralization of object-libido as a sublimation of 
drive energy which, in turn, provides the store of narcissistic libido required for future 
sublimations in the form of object-cathexes. 
Insofar as sublimation is the work of desexualized ego-libido, the process of 
sublimating an instinct depends upon the formation of a mature ego. As Hans W. 
Loewald points out, "in itself, sublimatory transformation of instinct seems indebted to 
'civilizing' constraints coming from parents, models, teachers—in short, to educational 
experiences in the broad sense."91 In this regard, sublimation presupposes an individual 
who has undergone certain "basic" maturational developments and, correspondingly, the 
repression of certain 'immature' modes of gratification.92 For instance, the "normal" 
maturation of the individual through the oral, anal, and phallic stages of psychosexual 
development results in the mature organization of the mind and body under the primacy 
of "genitality." This process involves both the establishment of a fully developed ego 
governed by the secondary process and the mature organization of a body capable of 
"higher" pleasures. This organization of both the psychical and somatic apparatuses 
enables an individual to divert his or her libido towards non-sexual modes of 
gratification. Rather than completely repressing certain instinctual impulses, sublimation 
involves the incorporation of these impulses "within the ego-organization by way of 
channeling, organizing processes." 
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In Freud's essay Leonardo da Vinci, which is perhaps his most detailed treatment 
of sublimation, Freud identifies Leonardo's rejection of directly sexual strivings as a 
paradigmatic instance of the sublimatory transformation of instinct. On his account, 
Leonardo was not consumed by the desire for immediate sexual gratification. On the 
contrary, he "appears to us as a man whose sexual need and activity were extraordinarily 
low, as if a higher striving had raised him above the common animal need of mankind."94 
Rather than seeking instinctual gratification through overtly sexual activity, Leonardo 
"transmuted his passion into inquisitiveness" and allowed his tamed sexual energy to 
"flow off freely like a branch of a stream."95 Although he underwent various stages of 
necessary repression in early childhood, "the libido withdraws from the fate of the 
repression by being sublimated from the outset into curiosity, and by reinforcing the 
powerful investigation impulse."96 In this regard, sublimation depends upon the 
'reversibility' of certain early childhood repressions which, in turn, liberates ego-libido 
for non-sexual and socially useful strivings. 
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud argues that sublimation enables 
individuals to overcome the inevitable pain and anxiety experienced under a repressive 
civilization. He claims that a principal "technique for avoiding suffering makes use of the 
displacements of the libido that are permitted by our psychical apparatus and lend its 
functioning so much flexibility." Through this method, the individual attempts to 
"displace the aims of the drives in such a way that they cannot be frustrated by the 
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external world." In this sense, sublimation allows individuals to seek more "civilized" 
modes of gratification despite the pressures of the reality principle. Furthermore, Freud 
seems to equate this vicissitude with the pursuit of "higher" pleasures and activities. 
"Sublimation of the drives," he writes, "is a particularly striking feature of cultural 
development, which makes it possible for the higher mental activities—scientific, artistic 
• OS 
and ideological—to play such a significant role in civilized life." In contradistinction to 
non-human animals and our pre-civilized ancestors, human beings have the distinct 
ability to overcome our basic appetitive desires by channeling our libidinal energy 
towards "intellectual, scientific and artistic achievements," all of which are indispensable 
elements of human civilization. 
Although Freud does consider sublimation to be a distinctly human ability which 
distinguishes us from other living beings, he identifies a flaw in the use of sublimation as 
a means of avoiding suffering and pursuing higher pleasures. While Leonardo was able to 
sublimate his sexual desire due to special environmental circumstances and favourable 
predispositions,100 Freud believes that most individuals have neither the upbringing nor 
the requisite mental constitution to sublimate their drives. He writes that sublimation 
"presupposes special aptitudes and gifts that are not exactly common, not common 
enough to be effective. And even to the few it cannot afford complete protection against 
suffering; it does not supply them with an armour that is proof against the slings and 
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arrows of fortune." Accordingly, both the analyst and society itself contribute to 
individuals' frustration by demanding that they sublimate their drives beyond their 
capacities. 
While this description may sound elitist—since the distinct human ability to 
sublimate instinctual drives is now attributed to the most gifted individuals—I will argue 
in the next section that Marcuse clarifies this concept and restores its usefulness through 
his historicization of Freud's notion of repression. According to Marcuse, it is primarily 
the unnecessary repressions demanded by a "surplus-repressive" civilization that stifle 
individuals' ability to channel their instinctual energy in self-affirming ways. By 
suggesting the possibility of eliminating these "surplus" modes of repression, Marcuse 
believes that individuals will be able to express themselves more freely in a 
fundamentally transformed society. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the concluding chapter of Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud makes it clear 
1 09 
that his argument is intended neither as an indictment nor as a defence of civilization. 
Rather, he claims that he is merely attempting to describe the "essence" of civilization 
and the inevitable renunciations and delays in instinctual gratification that it demands of 
its citizens. Considering the brute fact of "Ananke"—understood here in terms of the 
scarcity of material resources and the necessity of shared work103-—Freud believes that 
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civilized individuals must forego their instinctual desires and submit to the demands of 
the reality principle. At best, those with favourable mental capacities and the proper 
upbringing will be able to sublimate their libidinal impulses into the socially acceptable 
channels left open to them. Considering the inevitability of repressive civilization, then, 
Freud responds to both the "well-behaved and pious believers" who surrender to the 
necessity of sexual repression and to the "wildest revolutionaries" who wish to overcome 
it, that he "cannot bring them any consolation."104 
The remainder of this essay will explore the theoretical and historical possibilities 
of envisaging a "non-repressive" civilization by tracing the development of Marcuse's 
critical theory of sexuality. Since Marcuse's critique of sexual repression in Eros and 
Civilization oscillates between penetrating explications of psychoanalytic theory and his 
own critical "extrapolation" of Freud's work, I can now consider Marcuse's unique 
appropriation of psychoanalysis on its own terms. The point of this chapter has been to 
elucidate the Freudian Bildungsmachte necessary to complete this task. 
Ibid., p. 106. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MARCUSE'S CRITICAL APPROPRIATION OF FREUD: EROS AND 
CIVILIZATION 
According to Marcuse, "[t]he notion that a non-repressive civilization is 
impossible is a cornerstone of Freudian theory."105 Indeed, Freud considers the reality 
principle to be a "transhistorical" obstacle to the free gratification of human drives.106 In 
this regard, Marcuse believes that Freud's theory seems to preclude the possibility of 
envisaging a society that does not demand painful delays in gratification and the 
subjugation of the individual's instinctual impulses to the reality principle. Yet Marcuse 
argues that Freud comes to this conclusion by considering a specific historical form of the 
reality principle to be the reality principle as such. Insofar as he does this, Freud fails to 
recognize the extent to which the reality principle, as well as the repressions it demands, 
can be consciously redirected through human agency. 
Throughout Eros and Civilization, Marcuse offers several arguments for the 
theoretical and historical possibility of a "non-repressive civilization." To begin with, 
Marcuse claims that "Freud's own theory provides reasons for rejecting his identification 
of civilization with repression." On the one hand, Freud believes that there is an 
"eternal" antagonism between instinctual gratification and the exigencies of reality, 
between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. However, on Marcuse's account, 
Freud also reveals the fact that civilization depends upon the continuous reproduction of 
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specific forms of repression. In the face of a society that could provide for the needs of its 
citizens and allow a greater degree of gratification, civilization demands the sustained 
repression of individuals' instinctual demands. 
This reveals to Marcuse that the reality principle, far from being eternal and 
unchanging, is constantly being recreated in the interest of dominating individuals and 
controlling the scope of their desires. Insofar as Freud exposes the fact that the "highest 
values and achievements of culture" are perpetuated through historically specific modes 
of repression, then, Marcuse claims that "he denies the equation of reason with repression 
on which the ideology of culture is built." 
As we recall from the previous chapter, Freud also argues that the demands of the 
pleasure principle retain their strength in the unconscious and can often penetrate into 
consciousness despite the pressures of the reality principle.109 Considering these remarks, 
Marcuse maintains that the pleasure principle is never completely repressed, but 
"continues to exist in civilization" in the form of phantasies and dreams.110 Paraphrasing 
Freud, he writes that "one mode of thought-activity is 'split off from the new 
organization of the mental apparatus and remains free from the rule of the reality 
principle: phantasy is 'protected from cultural alterations' and stays committed to the 
pleasure principle."111 As such, Freud's own theory reveals that phantasy resists being 
"educated" by the reality principle and that the repression of instinctual demands can be 
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reversed. It is on the basis of this "hidden trend in psychoanalysis" that Marcuse finds the 
theoretical possibility of envisaging a "non-repressive civilization." 
In this chapter, I will attempt to 'come to terms' with Marcuse's historical 
extrapolation of Freud by critically explicating his central concepts and considering a few 
key objections to his position. In Section 1,1 will focus on Marcuse's notions of "surplus-
repression" and the "performance principle," which he employs in order to historicize 
Freud's concepts of repression and the reality principle, respectively. After explicating 
these terms, I will explain why Marcuse believes that sublimation perpetuates surplus-
repression under advanced industrial society. 
In Section 2, I shall begin by briefly distilling Marcuse's arguments concerning 
phantasy, imagination, and the aesthetic dimension. Although my discussion of these 
ideas will be selective, my goal is to explain how he employs Freud's notions of phantasy 
and imagination in order to envisage a new relationship between sensuousness and 
reason, pleasure and reality. On this basis, I will elucidate his arguments regarding "non-
repressive sublimation" as a method by which individuals may channel their instinctual 
desires in self-affirming ways under a fundamentally improved reality principle. 
Lastly, Section 3 will focus on Marcuse's claim that the pursuit of instinctual 
liberation necessarily involves a struggle against "time." After briefly responding to 
Whitebook's arguments against Marcuse's interpretation of "primary narcissism," I will 
attempt to answer Whitebook's question as to what he means when he advocates the 
rejection of time. In this regard, I will offer two possible meanings of Marcuse's claim 
that a qualitatively better reality principle necessitates a struggle against time and death. 
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SECTION 1: SURPLUS REPRESSION AND THE PERFORMANCE PRINCIPLE 
In the "Preface" to Eros and Civilization, Marcuse claims that he "employs 
psychological categories because they have become political categories." Insofar as 
individuals are constituted and, in the present context, dominated by the society in which 
they grow and develop, he believes that psychological processes are influenced by social 
and political factors. Accordingly, Marcuse argues that "the Freudian terms, which do not 
adequately differentiate between the biological and the socio-historical vicissitudes of the 
instincts, must be paired with corresponding terms denoting the specific socio-historical 
component."113 He thus begins his discussion by extrapolating several of Freud's basic 
psychoanalytic concepts in a way that reflects the societal influence upon the individual's 
psychical processes. 
Marcuse argues that the instincts undergo certain modifications, repressions, and 
deflections as a result of the external factors impressed upon them. As we recall, he 
employs the Freudian notion of "instinct" to refer to the "primary drives" of the 
individual, which are "subject to historical modification; they find mental as well as 
somatic representation."114 Based on this definition, it is clear that Marcuse is relying 
upon Freud's characterization of instinct in "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," in which he 
claims that the instinct is the "psychical representative" of the bodily "source" of 
impulses within the individual. Whereas the "aim" of an instinct is in every instance the 
satisfaction of that impulse, the "object" of the instinct—either within or outside the 
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body—is the "most variable" aspect of the instinct and is subject to change.115 On 
Marcuse's account, then, "the reality which shapes the instincts as well as their needs and 
satisfaction is a socio-historical world."116 Under advanced industrial civilization, he 
believes that the instincts are unnecessarily repressed, modified, and deflected towards 
certain objects in the interests of dominating the individual. 
For his purposes, Marcuse defines repression "in the non-technical sense to 
designate both conscious and unconscious, external and internal processes of restraint, 
constraint, and suppression."117 Recalling my explication of repression in the previous 
chapter, Freud himself seems to provide some justification for Marcuse's broad definition 
of repression. To begin with, Freud emphasizes the fact that the ego contains both 
conscious and unconscious elements and that it carries out repressions as a result of both 
the "internal" demands of the superego and the "external" obstacles in the outside world. 
Furthermore, Marcuse's description of repression as "restraint, constraint, and 
suppression," mirrors Freud's often loose descriptions of instinctual renunciation in his 
later work. In Civilization and Its Discontents, for instance, Freud claims that civilization 
"presupposes the non-satisfaction of powerful drives—by suppression, repression or 
t 1 Q 
some other means." Thus, Freud's characterization of repression seems to lend itself to 
Marcuse's revised definition of this term. 
On the basis of his more comprehensive definition of repression, Marcuse 
historicizes this concept further by distinguishing between "basic repression" and 
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"surplus-repression." Whereas basic repression denotes "the 'modifications' of the 
instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization," surplus-
repression refers to the modes of restraint necessitated by a specific society bent on the 
domination of human beings and the natural environment.119 By drawing this initial 
conceptual distinction, Marcuse is able to differentiate between those modes of repression 
which are indispensable to the survival of human life and those which unnecessarily 
deprive individuals of instinctual gratification and material needs. 
As Morton Schoolman correctly observes, the distinction between "basic and 
surplus-repression" is modeled on Marx's distinction between "socially necessary and 
surplus-labour."120 To put it briefly, Marx argues that socially necessary labour produces 
"value," which takes the form of "exchange-value" and "use-value." While the exchange-
value of a product refers to "its trading power or ability to relate to other products on the 
basis of embodied labor-time," use-value refers to the power of that product to satisfy a 
human need.122 When workers produce value over and above what is required to sustain 
both themselves and the means of production, they are said to produce "surplus-value," 
which takes the form of profit. However, rather than being returned to the workers on the 
basis of how much surplus-value they create, this profit is hoarded by the owners of the 
means of production. Accordingly, Marx refers to the labour required to produce surplus-
value as "surplus-labour," which denotes the unpaid labour required to produce additional 
value for the capitalist alone. 
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On the basis of this brief explication of Marx, it is clear that the notion of 
"surplus-repression" is inspired by Marx's notion of "surplus-labour." Just as "surplus-
labour" is the labour over and above what is required for the workers to sustain 
themselves, "surplus-repression" involves the socially demanded renunciation of 
instinctual impulses beyond what is required for the individuals' survival. In both cases, 
individuals are forced to forego their life-satisfaction unnecessarily and without receiving 
any additional benefit. Furthermore, "basic repression" is inspired by Marx's notion of 
"socially necessary labour." Just as "socially necessary labour" refers to the work 
required to sustain the individual and society itself, "basic repression" refers to the 
instinctual renunciations necessary to ensure the individual's survival and the survival of 
society as a whole. 
The notion of "basic repression" reveals the extent of Marcuse's agreement with 
Freud on the issue of instinctual renunciation. Insofar as civilization depends upon the 
subordination of many instinctual desires to the exigencies of socially necessary labour, a 
certain degree of "basic" repression will always be required. The crucial issue, however, 
is whether or not the repression of an instinctual impulse deprives individuals of 
satisfactions that civilization could grant without compromising its basic social 
organization or the overall capabilities of individuals. On this point, Marcuse provides the 
example of a young child who "feels the 'need' to cross the street any time at its will." In 
this situation, he argues that the "repression of this 'need' is not repressive of human 
potentialities."123 In other words, the demand that the child renounce his or her immediate 
desire to cross the street is not employed in the interest of dominating him or her, but to 
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 224. 
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equip this immature child with the means to survive in the face of external demands. In 
this regard, Marcuse claims that basic repression is tantamount to the "rational exercise of 
authority."124 
Insofar as Marcuse concedes to Freud's view that civilization depends upon the 
inhibition of certain drives, he also admits the existence of a "basic" reality principle. As 
Joel Whitebook explains, Marcuse agrees that there is "a transhistorical dimension of the 
human condition—a basic reality principle, as it were—but construes it in such a way as 
to minimize its ultimate importance."125 In other words, he believes that there will always 
be a "basic" reality principle, but he claims that it is not the most significant cause of the 
unnecessary renunciation of desire enforced by civilization. While the basic reality 
principle includes "the renunciation, however minimal, that will always be necessary to 
negotiate the metabolism between humanity and external nature,"126 Marcuse argues that 
the demands of the current reality principle extend beyond this basic minimum and 
involve the thoroughgoing domination of all aspects of human life. He maintains that "the 
specific historical institutions of the reality principle and the specific interests of 
domination introduce additional controls over and above those indispensable for civilized 
human association." These modes of "surplus-repression" fundamentally alter the 
character of the reality principle itself. 
Marcuse writes that the rational exercise of authority, "which is inherent in any societal division of 
labor, is derived from knowledge and confined to the administration of functions and arrangements 
necessary for the advancement of the whole. In contrast, domination is exercised by a particular group or 
individual in order to sustain and enhance itself in a privileged position." Ibid., p. 36. 
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Marcuse labels the current historical form of the reality principle the 
"performance principle" and argues that "under its rule society is stratified according to 
the competitive economic performances of its members."128 Under the capitalist mode of 
production, he argues, individuals are reduced to the "functions" they perform for an 
apparatus that they do not control. Considering the fact that individuals spend the 
majority of their waking lives labouring for a system that does not represent their 
interests, their work is typically unsatisfying, toilsome, and alienating.129 As Theodor 
Adorno so forcefully remarks in History and Freedom, which is perfectly appropriate 
here, even those who have reached the greatest "heights" of the work world "cannot 
enjoy their positions because even these have been whittled away to the point where they 
are merely functions of their own function."130 Under the performance principle, then, 
individuals come to internalize the demands of the capitalist labour system and accept the 
"necessity" of unpleasurable labour. 
While the technological and scientific achievements of advanced industrial 
civilization have established the material preconditions for reducing the necessity of 
toilsome labour, Marcuse claims that this society rationalizes the necessity of such labour 
by appealing to "scarcity." On this view, the world is too poor in material and social 
resources to provide for all the needs and capabilities of its citizens. Accordingly, 
individuals must perform toilsome, alienated labour in order to overcome the "natural" 
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scarcity of resources. In response, Marcuse claims that the material and social inequalities 
in the advanced societies are "no longer due chiefly to the poverty of human and natural 
resources but to the manner in which they are distributed and utilized."131 Indeed, in the 
face of a society that could qualitatively improve human life on the basis of its existing 
technological capabilities, the repressive distribution of scarcity is made to appear natural 
and unavoidable. Inasmuch as this "natural" condition has been used to rationalize the 
surplus-repressive organization of human life, Marcuse claims that "it has become 
irrational."132 
In order to ensure that individuals devote the majority of their waking lives to 
performing their pre-established, alienated functions, Marcuse argues that the surplus-
repressive "distribution of time" is also a fundamental element of the performance 
principle: "[m]an exists only part-time, during the working days, as an instrument of 
alienated performance; the rest of the time he is free for himself."133 Despite the fact that 
this individual's free time could potentially be used for the attainment of pleasure, 
Marcuse believes that the individual is prevented from achieving lasting instinctual 
gratification by virtue of the sheer length of the working day itself. He claims that the 
"tiresome and mechanical routine" of individuals' everyday, unfulfilling performances 
"require that leisure be a passive relaxation and a re-creation of energy for work."134 If 
repressed individuals are to derive any pleasure outside of work, these "passive" leisure 
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activities are intended to temporarily rejuvenate the workers in order to prepare them for 
toilsome labour. 
Marcuse also emphasizes the extent to which the individual's pleasures and 
satisfactions are efficiently coordinated with the dictates of the performance principle. 
Already in the 1950s, Marcuse recognizes the ubiquity of the culture industry: "Not until 
the late stage of industrial civilization.. .has the technique of mass manipulation 
developed an entertainment industry which directly controls leisure time."135 
Accordingly, individuals are indoctrinated to associate pleasure and gratification with the 
goods and services provided by the establishment. Every moment of the individual's life 
is to be permeated not only with the beliefs and values of the performance principle, but 
also with its comforts, commodities, and prescribed aspirations.136 As Douglas Kellner 
explains, "if individuals are allowed to experience too much pleasure outside work, or 
have too much time to question their alienated existence, they might perhaps revolt and 
cause trouble, or drop out of the system." 
Marcuse argues against this temporal reduction of the individual's potential for 
pleasure by recalling Freud's argument concerning the "timelessness" of the id. As I 
argued in the last chapter, Freud maintains that the id is "timeless" in the sense that its 
attempt to satisfy instinctual impulses does not occur in any specific temporal sequence 
and that temporal constraints do not affect its instinctual demands.138 At this point, 
Marcuse adds that "the pleasure principle which governs the id is 'timeless' also in the 
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sense that it militates against the temporal dismemberment of pleasure, against its 
distribution in small separated doses."139 Under the performance principle, he argues, 
individuals are trained to forget this demand for timeless gratification as an end in itself. 
Instead, they are taught to treat pleasure as a mere means to the end of being better 
prepared for labour. 
In addition to the "temporal dismemberment of pleasure," Marcuse also discusses 
the "spatial" reduction of pleasure through his extrapolation of Freud's notion of "genital 
primacy." As I discussed briefly in the last chapter, Freud believes that the normal 
maturation of the individual involves the movement through the oral, anal, and phallic 
stages before culminating in the centralization of pleasure to the genitals. This is a 
biological process which contains both psychic as well as somatic aspects: psychically, it 
involves the maturation of the mental apparatus from the primary process to the 
secondary process; somatically, it involves biological processes that eventually situate 
pleasure in the genitals, which would occur in all conceivable civilizations. 
Marcuse recognizes this "biological" necessity of the genital orientation of 
pleasure. He claims that the "'containment' of the partial sexual impulses, the progress to 
genitality belong to this basic layer of repression which makes possible intensified 
pleasure," and, therefore, that "the maturation of the organism involves the normal and 
natural maturation of pleasure."140 This maturational process enables the individual to 
master the "partial" sexual impulses, which initially pursue gratification in radically 
individualistic ways, by "fusing" them under the genital function. Thus, both Freud and 
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 47. 
Ibid., p. 38. 
54 
Marcuse acknowledge that the maturation of the organism to genital primacy is a 
necessary process which results in the establishment of a mature mind and body. 
Yet Marcuse goes on to claim that throughout the history of civilization, "the 
normal progress to genitality has been organized in such a way that the partial impulses 
and their 'zones' were all but desexualized in order to conform to the requirements of a 
specific social organization of the human existence."141 In this regard, Marcuse reveals 
the surplus-repressive aspects of the centralization of pleasure to the genitals. Insofar as 
the "basic" maturational progression to genitality is socially restricted to the "procreative 
function"—which contains hetero-normative implications—and insofar as society 
"taboos as perversions" virtually all manifestations of the sexual instincts that do not 
prepare for genital intercourse, he believes that this process is surplus-repressive. 
Considering his view that the basic progression to genitality is itself a "natural" 
process, Marcuse maintains that the surplus-repressive "organization of sexuality" 
introduces additional restrictions to this process over and above what is required for the 
development of a mature individual. The socially imposed demand that sexual activity 
must occur within the confines of monogamous, heterosexual relationships and the 
requirement that any pleasure derived from this activity must be an inconsequential result 
of the primary task of reproduction, are examples of the surplus-repressive organization 
of sexual pleasure. According to Marcuse, such modes of surplus-repression "are added 
to the basic (phylogenetic) restrictions of the instincts which mark the development of 
man from the human animal to the animal sapiens."142 The societal constraints imposed 
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upon the libido are necessitated by the performance principle in order to channel 
individuals' libidinal energy into "socially useful performances."143 In this regard, 
Marcuse argues that surplus-repression "achieves the socially necessary desexualization 
of the body: the libido becomes concentrated in one part of the body, leaving most of the 
rest free for use as the instrument of labor." 
In response to this discussion of "genital supremacy," Morton Schoolman 
dismisses Marcuse's argument by offering a "corrected" interpretation of Freudian 
theory.145 Although he levels several attacks against Marcuse's interpretation and 
appropriation of genitality, his principal argument is that Marcuse fails to appreciate the 
strictly biological nature of Freud's argument. While he agrees that the centralization of 
pleasure to the genitals "may have been enforced by the repressive mechanisms of the 
performance principle" at the phylogenetic level, he claims that this historical process 
eventually becomes "sedimented as biology."146 If this is the case, then the maturation of 
the mind and body to genitality is no longer sustained through repression, but becomes 
"human nature" proper. 
On these grounds, Schoolman argues that Marcuse takes his historicization of 
Freud too far. He claims that by "identifying the genital organization of the instincts with 
repression, Marcuse means to imply that the maturation process that Freud believed to be 
biological and irrevocable is actually social and potentially subject to conscious 
redirection and control."147 In stating this, Schoolman implies that Marcuse has a problem 
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with the development to genitality as such and, furthermore, that he is calling for the 
complete reversal of genitality. To conclude this point, Schoolman argues that it is "not 
possible to reverse the genital instinctual maturation and it makes little sense to equate 
this event with a process of alienation supposedly open to social intervention."148 
Although Schoolman is correct that the basic maturation of pleasure to the 
genitals cannot be reversed, he falsely accuses Marcuse of believing that it can. The 
fundamental error in Schoolman's assessment lies in his failure to appreciate the 
distinction between basic and surplus repression, which he does not mention in his 
critique of Marcuse's discussion of genital primacy. Far from arguing that the "basic" 
repressive modification of the instincts can or should be reversed, Marcuse is claiming 
that the societal organization of this basic maturational process introduces unnecessary 
repressions into the individual's psychic and somatic development.149 
When Schoolman does mention surplus-repression—after he has "corrected" 
Marcuse's interpretation of Freud—his misinterpretation of Marcuse comes into full 
view. He claims that, according to Marcuse, "genital 'repression,' the historical 
catastrophe in each life that alters human nature to perform a lifetime of hard labor, is no 
longer socially necessary and now is to be judged as surplus-repression."150 Again, at no 
point does Marcuse suggest that the basic maturation of pleasure to the genitals as such is 
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surplus-repressive. Rather, he believes that the "fusion" of the partial impulses becomes 
surplus-repressive when their manifestations are completely tabooed by society. As Gad 
Horowitz puts it: "Marcuse argues that the total renunciation of the desire for 
gratification in non-genital zones of the body, except as 'forepleasure,' a prelude to 
penis-in-vagina intercourse.. .is a result of surplus repression."151 
According to Whitebook, Marcuse appears to be implying that the individual 
undergoes "something like surplus genitalization," which is "superimposed on the 
maturational process" by the division of labour and the demands of the patriarchal family. 
However, Whitebook also claims that the biological nature of this process "tends to drop 
out of his historicizing analysis, and the weight of his argument shifts almost completely 
to the socially imposed stratum of repression."152 Accordingly, Marcuse argues that the 
"socially necessary desexualization" of the body is a result of the hierarchical division of 
labour and that the fusion of the partial instincts occurs in order to prepare the individual 
for alienated labour. Nevertheless, Marcuse allows the basic repressive aspects of genital 
primacy to "drop out" of his analysis because he has already made it clear that he is only 
arguing against the surplus-repressive organization of sexual pleasure. Although Marcuse 
is not always clear as to whether he is referring to basic repression or surplus-
repression—primarily because he believes they have been "inextricably intertwined" 
throughout the history of civilization—he does make it clear that he only objects to the 
surplus-repressive organization of human life and that basic repression is unavoidable. 5 
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As I mentioned, the surplus-repressions imposed on the basic maturation to 
genitality also involve the "socially necessary desexualization" of the body.154 Like every 
other object of Marcuse's critical scrutiny, his sustained indictment of desexualization 
must also be understood in light of his distinction between basic and surplus-repression. 
While desexualization may take on basic repressive or non-repressive forms, Marcuse 
argues that socially necessary desexualization, which in this context means the 
desexualization necessitated by a society governed by the performance principle, is 
surplus-repressive. With this clarification in mind, we can begin to understand why 
Marcuse believes that even sublimation can perpetuate surplus-repression under the 
performance principle. 
To begin, Marcuse argues that insofar as sublimation involves the socially 
necessary desexualization of the sexual instincts, it also prevents Eros from controlling 
the death instincts. He claims that "desexualization, by weakening Eros, unbinds the 
destructive impulses. Civilization is thus threatened by an instinctual de-fusion, in which 
the death instinct strives to gain ascendancy over the life instincts. 55 Yet, as I have 
argued, Marcuse is not arguing against desexualization as such. Rather, he believes that 
desexualization must be understood within the framework of the society in which it is 
demanded. Under the performance principle, socially necessary desexualization results in 
the total subjugation of the partial instincts to genitality, and of genitality to the 
procreative function. Accordingly, sublimation rooted in this unnecessary desexualization 
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of Eros prevents the individual's erotic energy from binding the destructive instincts and 
thus perpetuates surplus-repression.156 
Furthermore, considering Marcuse's argument that the performance principle is 
characterized by surplus-repression, he believes that most forms of sublimation under late 
capitalism are rooted in the unnecessary repression of the pleasure principle and the 
instinctual drives which seek to satisfy it. He argues that the "repressive 'modification' of 
the pleasure principle precedes the actual sublimation, and the latter carries the repressive 
elements over into the socially useful activities."157 In this sense, although sublimation 
and repression are two very distinct processes, Marcuse believes that sublimation serves 
to perpetuate surplus-repression insofar as it is carried out by an unnecessarily repressed 
individual in a fundamentally unfree society. As Horowitz nicely concludes, sublimation 
"is surplus-repressive insofar as it is based on renunciation of desires which need not be 
renounced for the sake of ego development or civilization per se."158 
SECTION 2: FROM SEXUALITY TO EROS 
On the basis of his extrapolation of Freud's theory, Marcuse attempts to reveal the 
historical and theoretical possibilities of establishing a fundamentally improved 
relationship between pleasure and reality, sensuousness and reason. By revealing both the 
socio-historical content of the contemporary reality principle and the specific modes of 
Indeed, as we shall see at the end of this section, Marcuse believes that desexualization under non-
repressive conditions is the key to envisaging non-repressive modes of sublimation. 
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surplus-repression that characterize advanced industrial civilization, he attempts to 
provide support for the possibility of a civilization without unnecessary repression. 
Although every society will inevitably require a certain degree of "basic" instinctual 
renunciation, Marcuse argues that the technological and scientific achievements of late 
capitalism could provide for the increased satisfaction of human needs while substantially 
reducing the need for unnecessary instinctual restraint. As he remarks: "the very 
achievements of repressive civilization seem to create the preconditions for the gradual 
abolition of repression."159 
Recalling his earlier arguments concerning the power of phantasy to uphold the 
tabooed aspirations of the pleasure principle, Marcuse now attempts to show how this 
mental faculty can be effective in pointing to the necessity of a non-repressive reality 
principle. As we have seen, Freud argues that the conversion of the pleasure ego into the 
reality ego "splits" the mental apparatus into reality-testing and phantasy. On this basis, 
Freud draws a distinction between "the sexual instincts and phantasy" and "the ego 
instincts and the activities of consciousness."160 By virtue of this separation, Marcuse 
argues that while the ego interprets, manipulates, and transforms reality, phantasy is 
relegated to the unconscious and thus becomes unrealistic and powerless. 
At this point, Marcuse reveals that phantasy can become a significant source of 
social change through "the incorporation of phantasy into artistic (and even normal) 
consciousness."161 He argues that phantasy can manifest itself consciously through the 
work of "imagination" while retaining its close affinity with the sexual instincts. In this 
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respect, "phantasy has a truth value of its own, which corresponds to an experience of its 
own - namely, the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality."162 This truth lies in its 
memory of the original unity between the two divisions of the mind—the integral 
connection between phantasy and the reality-testing ego before their differentiation. 
Insofar as it is able to retain this memory and manifest itself in conscious forms through 
the work of imagination in art, phantasy points to the possibility of a fundamentally new 
reality principle that unifies integral instinctual gratification with the exigencies of the 
external world. 
Based on the power of the imagination to consciously express the demands of the 
forgotten pleasure principle, Marcuse attempts to identify the '"culture-heroes' who have 
persisted in imagination," and who might point beyond the existing reality principle. 
First, he identifies Prometheus as the culture-hero of the performance principle. He 
claims that Prometheus "symbolizes productiveness, the unceasing effort to master life; 
but, in his productivity, blessing and curse, progress and toil are inextricably 
intertwined." Considering the fact that surplus-repression and alienated labour grow 
stronger the more unnecessary they become, Prometheus symbolizes this same fateful 
dialectic of contemporary civilization. 
As such, Marcuse looks for the polemical counter-images of this repressive reality 
principle, which he finds in Orpheus and Narcissus. On the one hand, Orpheus pacifies 
the animals and trees in the forest through song and, in doing so, unites these living 
beings through the experience of joy.164 He thus rejects the repressive organization of 
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human life in favour of music and satisfaction. However, the fact that Orpheus is 
"nothing but a harp player" does not mean that he is incapable of performing work. 
Rather, as Horowitz explains, "it means that the central meaning and purpose of his life is 
gratification."165 
On the other hand, Narcissus becomes captivated by his own image in the stream 
"in which all forms pass and flee," the river of change and becoming.166 He attempts to 
arrest the flow of time and change in order to capture his own beauty, which Marcuse 
interprets as the rejection of the repressive organization of time. In this regard, Narcissus 
symbolizes sleep and death, the triumph of the "static" over the "dynamic."167 Yet this 
does not suggest that Narcissus abandons Eros in favour of the death instincts; he "lives 
by an Eros of his own," which establishes an indissoluble bond between himself and the 
external world.168 
Both Orpheus and Narcissus represent the "Great Refusal" of the established 
reality principle: "theirs is the image of joy and fulfillment; the voice which does not 
command but sings; the gesture which offers and receives; the deed which is peace and 
ends the labor of conquest; the liberation from time which unites man with god, man with 
nature."169 Furthermore, both protest against the repressive organization of pleasure, not 
by abandoning erotic strivings, but by attempting to achieve a "fuller Eros."170 This fuller 
Eros captures dimensions of erotic gratification that have been repressed under the 
performance principle. Through these images, then, gratification is transformed from a 
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"part-time" leisure activity operating within the confines of surplus-genitality, to integral 
instinctual fulfillment in an environment of freedom and unity. 
On the basis of these two images, Marcuse finds new significance in Freud's 
notion of primary narcissism. Returning to the first chapter of Civilization and Its 
Discontents, he argues that primary narcissism denotes not only the denial of reality and 
the infantile auto-eroticism that must be overcome in order to establish a mature ego, but 
also as a deeper connectedness with the outside world. He reveals the "striking paradox 
that narcissism, usually understood as egotistic withdrawal from reality, here is connected 
with oneness with the universe."171 Although Freud is critical of this "oceanic feeling,"172 
Marcuse finds in primary narcissism and the oceanic feeling the possibility of a new 
existential relation to reality. He argues that "beyond all immature autoeroticism, 
narcissism denotes a fundamental relatedness to reality which may generate a 
comprehensive existential order."173 Thus, primary narcissism could be the key to 
establishing a deeper affinity between individuals and the natural and social environment. 
After identifying Orpheus and Narcissus as the images of another reality 
principle, Marcuse returns to the critical role of imagination by recapturing the traditional 
function of the "aesthetic dimension." To begin, he attempts to invalidate the notion that 
the aesthetic dimension, like the imagination, refers exclusively to an unrealistic realm 
that cannot be "lived" in reality. Under the rule of a repressive reality principle, reason 
comes to prevail over the demands of the senses and the latter are deprived of their 
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critical function. This radical disarticulation of the "aesthetic" from concrete social life 
is the result of a "cultural repression" of those "contents and truths that are inimical to the 
performance principle."175 
In order to bridge this gap between the "aesthetic" and reality, Marcuse turns to 
the aesthetic theories of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller. For Kant and Schiller, the 
"aesthetic aims at a realm which preserves the truth of the senses and reconciles, in the 
reality of freedom, the 'lower' and the 'higher' faculties of man, sensuousness and 
intellect, pleasure and reason."176 On Kant's view, "judgement" mediates between the 
faculties of sense and knowledge, nature and freedom. The "aesthetic dimension" is the 
realm in which these two faculties meet and achieve reconciliation through the 
"imagination." 
Schiller, proceeding from Kant, also seeks to unite the demands of the senses and 
the intellect. He argues that a conflict arises between the "play impulse" and the "form 
impulse." Whereas the "play impulse" is the demand for sensuous gratification from the 
external world, the "form impulse" refers to the individual's rational faculty, which 
establishes scientific and moral laws. Marcuse claims that Schiller's Aesthetic Education 
"aims at basing morality on a sensuous ground; the laws of reason must be reconciled 
with the interest of the senses."178 Through this reconciliation, toilsome labour is 
transformed into "play," the gratification of the individual's sensuous needs, while 
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repressive productivity becomes the free "display" of human faculties. Thus, both Kant 
and Schiller point to the reconciliation of reason and sensuousness, nature and freedom. 
In order to open the horizon for a new reality principle on the basis of this 
theoretical reconciliation of sensuousness and reason, Marcuse turns to the concrete 
changes required to create a qualitatively improved civilization. To begin, he argues that 
the specific social and political institutions of the performance principle must be 
overcome. As John David Ober puts it, "men living under different social, political, and 
economic conditions might in turn create freer institutions under which the need for 
repression would greatly diminish."180 This depends, first of all, on the reduction of 
socially necessary labour time to a basic minimum. Since the sheer length of the working 
day imposes unnecessary restrictions on pleasure, the shortening of the working day is 
"the first prerequisite of freedom."181 
Under a new reality principle, Marcuse claims that the standard of living as it is 
typically conceived would decrease, while the quality of life would improve. Although 
this society would be able to provide for human needs on an ever-expanding scale, he 
claims that "many would have to give up manipulated comforts if all were to live a 
human life."182 It would thus require a new standard of living that measures social 
progress and freedom on human need-satisfaction and capability development, as well as 
on the absence of extraneous modes of libidinal renunciation. Furthermore, this society 
would require the minimization of waste and over-consumption. Beyond the rule of the 
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performance principle, Marcuse claims that "the level of living would be measured by 
other criteria: the universal gratification of the basic human needs, and the freedom from 
guilt and fear."183 
This quantitative reduction of labour time, wasteful consumption, and other 
modes of surplus-repression would lead to a "resexualization" of the body. Again, 
resexualization here must be understood as the reversal of those surplus-repressive modes 
of desexualization that confine sexual pleasure to the genitals and reduce sexual activity 
to the heterosexual, procreative function. "The re-erotization of the body," Horowitz 
explains, "means a heightened capacity for genital as well as non-genital pleasure, 
because surplus repression.. .cripples all the erotogenic zones, including the genitals."184 
Indeed, as we recall, Marcuse accepts the inevitability of the "basic" repressive 
organization of the body and mind under the genital function, while dismissing only its 
surplus-repressive aspects. 
Such a reversal of surplus-repression would reactivate "polymorphous perversity" 
in the sense that the surplus-repressive organization of sexuality would be overcome. 
"This regression," Marcuse writes, "would be psychical as well as social: it would 
reactivate early stages of the libido which were surpassed in the development of the 
reality ego, and it would dissolve the institutions of society in which the reality ego 
exists."185 Yet this process would not involve a complete regression to infantile forms of 
psychic and somatic organization. During these early stages, the child is not yet able to 
differentiate between self and other and, therefore, cannot take the needs and desires of 
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others into account. Furthermore, in this phase the sexual instincts strive for gratification 
in individualistic ways and are not yet fully organized under the genital function. As 
such, Marcuse wishes to recapture the experience of "polymorphous" modes of 
gratification in all "zones" of the body, while retaining the mature organization of the 
mental and somatic apparatuses. 
In order to clarify Marcuse's position, I propose that we adopt Horowitz's 
interpretation of "polymorphous perversity" as "polymorphous genitality." On 
Horowitz's account, this concept refers to "genitality that combined psychically genital 
object relations with freedom of expression for the pregenital component instincts within 
a genital organization of libido."186 In this way, we can clarify the fact that Marcuse 
wishes to preserve the "basic" repressive elements of the genital organization—the 
development of a mature mind and body for the reception of greater pleasures—while 
eliminating the surplus-repressive "organization" of genitality under the performance 
principle. Rather than arguing for the complete abolition of the genital function and its 
ability to "fuse" the sexual instincts, Marcuse believes that the "partial" sexual impulses 
must be "fused" without precluding their manifestations entirely. 
This reactivation of "polymorphous genitality" would lead to higher pleasures for 
the entire body and "eroticize" social relations more generally. It would activate 
previously tabooed zones and sexual relations in order to enhance individuals' capacity 
for libidinal gratification. "However," Marcuse writes, "the process just outlined involves 
not simply a release but a transformation of the libido: from sexuality constrained under 
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genital supremacy to eroticization of the entire personality." The individual's entire 
body, as well as the broader material and social relations, would become objects of 
libidinal cathexis. Individuals would then treat the attainment of pleasure as the central 
meaning and purpose of their lives, while also being capable of performing the "socially 
necessary" labour and instinctual restraint needed to preserve society as a whole. 
Under improved material and social conditions, sexuality would tend to "grow 
into Eros": it would progress from "mere sexuality," which is converted into a means to 
the end of procreation, to the "life instinct" as the unifying force which binds organic life 
into ever greater unities. Reason would then be shaped by the demands of Eros in the 
wider sense and give way to a new form of "sensuous rationality." In turn, the natural and 
social environment would be fashioned in accordance with the demands of the life 
instincts rather than being constrained, mastered, and dominated by the repressive reason 
of the performance principle. 
With the conversion of "sexuality into Eros" on the basis of fundamentally 
transformed institutions and social relations, sublimation would no longer serve to 
perpetuate the surplus-repressive organization of human life. Rather, Marcuse claims that 
Eros would strive towards life-enhancing modes of "non-repressive sublimation" in an 
environment of freedom. He argues that "its fully developed form would be sublimation 
without desexualization." Again, this does not suggest that all desexualization must be 
abolished in order to achieve non-repressive modes of sublimation. Indeed, recalling 
Freud's notion of narcissism, Marcuse agrees with Freud that sublimation occurs on the 
basis of transforming "object-libido" into desexualized "ego-libido," which is then sent 
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out into the external world in order to attain "higher" forms of gratification.188 On this 
basis, he argues that an eroticized social environment would eliminate surplus-repressive 
modes of desexualization and liberate libidinal energy for the pursuit of "activities and 
relations that are not sexual in the sense of 'organized' genital sexuality," but which are 
nonetheless "libidinal and erotic."189 
As we recall, Freud himself believes that sublimation leads to "higher" forms of 
gratification in the face of the necessary renunciations demanded by civilization. 
However, Marcuse argues that this type of sublimation operates on an individual who has 
been preconditioned to achieve limited instinctual gratification on a "part-time" basis, 
outside the parameters of alienated labour. In this case, individuals are only "free" to 
pursue instinctual gratification through the pre-established channels left open to them, 
while leaving the surplus-repressive performance principle intact. Under an improved 
reality principle, in which the demands of the pleasure principle are reconciled with the 
exigencies of non-alienated labour, individuals would be able to sublimate their libidinal 
energy in a non-repressive, "eroticized" environment. Libido would then take the road of 
"self-sublimation" under "conditions which relate associated individuals to each other in 
the cultivation of the environment for their developing needs and faculties."190 
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SECTION 3: MARCUSE ON TIME 
According to Marcuse, the establishment of a non-repressive reality principle 
necessitates the "conquest of time in so far as time is destructive of lasting 
gratification."191 Under the performance principle, individuals are only able to achieve 
pleasure outside the demands of alienated labour. Even beyond their work relations, 
individuals' potential for pleasure is limited by the prescribed enjoyments of the 
entertainment industry and the mass media. As we recall, Marcuse evokes the image of 
Narcissus to symbolize the "Great Refusal" against this repressive organization of time 
and the limitations it places on the attainment of integral instinctual gratification. 
Narcissus is able to halt the "flux of time" by striving to achieve a "fuller Eros" which 
establishes an indissoluble bond between himself and the external world. On Marcuse's 
account, by reducing the amount of socially necessary labour time and improving the 
quality of work relations on the basis of this deeper connectedness with external reality— 
a reactivation of "primary narcissism"—individuals will be able to overcome the 
repressive organization of time. 
In response to this argument, Joel Whitebook challenges Marcuse's discussion of 
time along a number of lines. To put it briefly, he claims that although "narcissism may 
point to a more connected, less distanced relation to reality in a perhaps overly 
oedipalized and scientized world," narcissism also involves the omnipotent denial of both 
the inevitable losses of early childhood and of external reality itself. Freud's notion of 
"Ananke," then, refers not only to "scarcity," but also to the "ineluctable," or the 
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unavoidable passage of time and the necessary losses and frustrations that result from 
it. It is only by overcoming these inescapable failures and losses in early childhood that 
the individual is able to master "infantile omnipotence," which involves the inability to 
distinguish between self and other and to consider the needs of individuals outside 
oneself. Therefore, by advocating the return to primary narcissism, Whitebook claims 
that Marcuse's position could potentially lead to the omnipotent denial of time and loss. 
Furthermore, Whitebook claims that Marcuse's "casual minimalization" of the 
Oedipus complex ignores the principal way in which this "infantile omnipotence" is 
overcome. Since the Oedipus complex results in the establishment of a superego that 
controls the ego and demands the repression of id impulses, this process is crucial for the 
development of a mature individual capable of "decentering" infantile omnipotence and 
dealing with the inevitable frustrations of the external world. Thus, without an 
"alternative means of taming infantile omnipotence," Marcuse fails to provide an 
adequate method of ensuring that the individual will develop a strong ego capable of 
handling frustration and loss. 
Although Whitebook is correct that Marcuse does minimize the "dark side" of 
narcissism, it should be stressed that Marcuse does acknowledge that narcissism is 
"usually understood as egotistic withdrawal from reality,"193 and emphasizes that he is 
not advocating a complete "regression" to infantile omnipotence. Rather, he advocates a 
return to "primary narcissism" in order to emphasize the need to establish a more vital 
connection between human beings and the external world. On this point, Horowitz claims 
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that Marcuse is not describing "a simple regression but a dialectical one, a regression 
under the control of and in the service of the ego."194 In this regard, the reactivation of 
primary narcissism would involve a cancellation of the antagonistic relation between 
individuals and their natural and social environment, a preservation of both the mature 
ego organization and society's technological capabilities, and the establishment of a 
higher unity between human beings and the external world. This experience of "oneness" 
with reality would then motivate individuals to create both a more enriching natural and 
social environment and qualitatively better working conditions. 
Furthermore, with regards to Whitebook's second point, it is true that Marcuse 
minimizes the Oedipus complex. However, this is likely due to his observation that the 
family has lost its traditional role in the socialization process. Indeed, Marcuse recognizes 
the critical role of the Oedipus complex in forming a fully developed "individual" with a 
mature ego. Yet he also believes that the socializing function of the family has been 
replaced by the direct control of individuals by the mass media, schools, and other social 
groups.195 In this regard, his minimization of the Oedipus complex results from the 
historical trends that have rendered this method of decentering infantile omnipotence 
obsolete, rather than from a denial of its importance.196 
With these clarifications in mind, we can now begin to understand what Marcuse 
means by the "conquest of time." First, Marcuse is not advocating the rejection of time as 
such, but only the repressive organization of time under the performance principle. He 
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argues that "[i]t is the alliance between time and the order of repression that motivates the 
efforts to halt the flux of time, and it is this alliance that makes time the deadly enemy of 
Eros."197 Since individuals are forced to spend the majority of their waking lives 
performing alienated labour, they do not have the time and energy to imagine the 
possibility of achieving more complete forms of gratification beyond the order of 
repression. In this sense, "the flux of time helps men to forget what was and what can be: 
it makes them oblivious to the better past and the better future."198 Although time remains 
a necessity, Marcuse believes that the reduction of unnecessary labour and the qualitative 
improvement of working conditions will afford individuals more time for lasting 
fulfillment in an environment of freedom. 
Marcuse's argument against the repressive flux of time is also illuminated by his 
claim that the life instincts necessarily militate against death, since "death is the final 
negativity of time."199 Just as the establishment uses the brute facts of "time" and 
"scarcity" as a rationalization for their surplus-repressive distribution and organization, 
he believes that the fact of death serves to justify even the most horrific of deaths: 
"[wjhether death is feared as constant threat, or glorified as supreme sacrifice, or 
accepted as fate, the education for the consent to death introduces an element of surrender 
into life from the beginning - surrender and submission."200 In this sense, the struggle 
against death would not seek to deny that it is a necessity, but to make death more 
tolerable by reducing the amount of unnecessary pain that accompanies it. "Like the other 
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necessities," he writes, "it can be made rational - painless. Men can die without anxiety if 
they know that what they love is protected from misery and oblivion."201 Thus, a 
fundamentally improved reality principle would seek to bring both time and death into 
the service of life, rather than allowing life to be controlled and determined by these 
necessities. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As we have seen, Marcuse ventures beyond the Freudian equation of civilization 
with repression by revealing the historical and theoretical possibilities of a fundamentally 
new relationship between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. By releasing the 
power of Eros to bind life into ever-greater unities through "self-sublimation," he 
believes that civilization could potentially overcome the surplus-repressive channeling of 
instinctual impulses and create a qualitatively improved natural and social environment. 
Yet Marcuse also begins to recognize the historical trends that counteract the 
development of this "non-repressive civilization." Although the technological capacities 
of advanced industrial society have created the conditions for the abolition of poverty, 
toil, and unnecessary instinctual restraint, they are actually being used to establish more 
efficient mechanisms of domination. With the rise of the mass media, the advertising 
industry, and the escalation of commodity production and exchange, the societal controls 
begin to permeate the private sphere and shape the individual's drives and needs. On the 
basis of this preconditioning, society is able to grant more sexual "liberties" to its 
1
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citizens. Recognizing this developing trend, Marcuse argues that "the relaxed sexual 
morality within the firmly entrenched system of monopolistic controls itself serves the 
system." By numbing the human faculties through controlled sexual liberties, this 
society reinforces its power over all dimensions of human life. It is precisely this trend 
which will characterize Marcuse's later work, to which we turn now. 
Ibid., p. 95. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE CONTAINMENT OF SEXUALITY IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL SOCIETY 
In One-Dimensional Man and throughout his subsequent thought, Marcuse 
continues his thoroughgoing critique of the repressive affluence of contemporary 
capitalist society by addressing the emerging social trends that he has briefly discussed in 
Eros and Civilization. Whereas his earlier critique of sexual repression focuses primarily 
on the repressive sublimation of libidinal energy into socially useful and unpleasurable 
labour, his later work focuses on a new set of trends: the relaxation of sexual taboos, the 
incorporation of sexual expression into the work place, and the exploitation of sexuality 
in advertising and the mass media. Far from liberating the individuals from alienated 
labour and surplus-repression, this system is now able to tolerate a greater degree of 
sexual liberty as a concession in order to stifle the individual's capacity "to recognize the 
disease of the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease." Accordingly, 
sublimation has been replaced by "desublimation," the immediate discharge of sexual 
energy within a system of effective, ubiquitous controls. 
In this final chapter, I intend to explicate this notion of "repressive desublimation" 
through a close examination of One-Dimensional Man and An Essay on Liberation. In 
Section 1, I will begin by highlighting several of Marcuse's key concepts. I shall 
elucidate his argument that the current advanced industrial apparatus is able to "contain" 
any and all transcendent modes of thought and creativity by neutralizing their 
oppositional force and pressing them into the service of the established order. This will 
Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 5. 
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lead into a discussion of "technological rationality," the dominant "dimension" of thought 
which serves to delegitimate the other subversive forms of thought and experience under 
late capitalism. Finally, I will explicate Marcuse's distinction between "false needs" and 
"vital needs" in order to reveal the ways in which human beings become dependent upon 
the commodities, services, and prescribed aspirations provided by the establishment. 
In Section 2, I will begin by elucidating Marcuse's arguments concerning 
"repressive desublimation" in the cultural sphere, where previously transgressive works 
of art are being assimilated to the requirements of capitalist production and consumption. 
According to Marcuse, this process of containment reveals the extent to which 
"technological rationality" comes to prevail over all opposition under late capitalism. On 
this basis, I shall discuss Marcuse's argument that the sexual instincts undergo the 
process of repressive desublimation through the manipulation of human needs and drives 
and the incorporation of libidinal components into the work world. Lastly, I will explicate 
Marcuse's claim that these sexual liberties numb the human faculties and weaken the 
"rationality of protest." 
In Section 3, I will examine Marcuse's "The Obsolescence of the Freudian 
Concept of Man" in order to account for the destructiveness that accompanies repressive 
desublimation. To begin, I will explain Marcuse's argument that repressive desublimation 
weakens Eros and, in turn, releases destructive energy. I shall then explicate his reasons 
for suggesting that the individual no longer undergoes the same processes of maturation 
as the traditional psychoanalytic subject and why this results in the willingness to 
conform to the beliefs and values of the current system. On these grounds, I shall argue 
that both the weakness of the ego to resist the repressive society and the inability of Eros 
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to bind the destructive instincts, account for the aggression that accompanies repressive 
desublimation. 
SECTION 1: TECHNOLOGICAL RATIONALITY AND CONTAINMENT 
Developing his earlier arguments in Eros and Civilization, Marcuse maintains that 
the technological achievements of advanced industrial civilization have created the 
conditions for the complete abolition of toil, hunger, and poverty on a global scale. 
However, in the face of this potential for liberation, society mobilizes itself against the 
specter of a world where all basic needs could be satisfied for the free play of human 
faculties and capabilities. He writes: "[fjaced with the possibility of pacification on the 
grounds of its technical and intellectual achievements, the mature industrial society closes 
itself against this alternative."204 Rather than being used to beautify the natural and social 
environment and to provide for basic human needs, the current technological capacities 
have been employed to produce superfluous commodities, military weapons, and other 
mind-numbing and destructive products. In Marcuse's terms, the productive forces are 
effectively "contained" and pressed into the service of the repressive system. 
This notion of "containment" also applies to the individual's potential for critical 
thought, experience, and action under the capitalist system. As we recall, Marcuse argues 
that "phantasy" can be expressed consciously through the work of imagination in artistic 
creation. In this way, artists have the ability to recall the forgotten demands of the 
pleasure principle and to illuminate the ways in which reality might be improved. 
Ibid., p. 17. 
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However, he now claims that this faculty has been effectively neutralized and 
impoverished by the advanced civilization: "[t]he order and organization of class society, 
which have shaped the sensibility and the reason of man, have also shaped the freedom of 
the imagination." In this regard, the imagination becomes bound to the repressive 
system and its realization is made to coincide with the dictates and interests of the 
establishment. 
For instance, the individual's imaginative capacities are now used to find more 
creative ways of exploiting the masses through advertising and the mass media. 
Furthermore, rather than being employed to envisage a better life for all individuals, the 
imagination becomes a valuable asset for the creation of bigger and better weapons and 
military strategies. The established society now appreciates imagination and creativity 
only insofar as they can be manipulated and employed in the interests of dominating 
human beings and nature in more effective ways. Thus, the imagination is "free to 
become practical, i.e., to transform reality only within the general framework of 
repression."206 
It should be stressed, however, that Marcuse does observe counter-tendencies to 
the repression of imagination. With the emergence of strong radical groups in the 1960s, 
he begins to identify many forms of political protest and refusal that attempt to articulate 
the values and truths of the "negative," oppositional dimension of thought and 
experience. For instance, he argues that the black radical movements in the United States 
represent a "Great Refusal" against the established system by redefining various words 
Idem, An Essay on Liberation, p. 29. 
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and images that had previously expressed the interests and beliefs of the dominant social 
groups. The term "soul" no longer refers to the "lily-white" soul of the established 
system, but becomes "black, violent, orgiastic," thus representing the struggle of the 
marginalized.207 Similarly, the nonconformist youth and student radicals use "flower 
power" as a method of resistance against the oppressive forces of the establishment, 
converting a beautiful image into a symbol of opposition. These rebellious groups protest 
not only against the ugliness, persecution, and destructiveness of this society, but also 
against its notions of beauty, imagination, and freedom.208 Thus, Marcuse turns to the 
marginalized and oppressed as a possible site of opposition against the established order. 
Yet even these movements are made to "operate" in the service of the 
establishment through the "containment" of their images and symbols within the 
framework of commodity production and consumption: subversive art is sold by 
transnational corporations; clothing and accessories containing images of revolutionary 
political figures are manufactured and distributed in order to make a profit; and 
previously tabooed sexual activities are encouraged and exploited. Under the advanced 
industrial apparatus, "transcendent" modes of thought and activity are made ineffectual 
by being assimilated to the totalizing system of domination. On Marcuse's account, this 
society can afford to tolerate virtually any transgressions, including those in the sexual 
sphere, by neutralizing their ability to pose a real threat to the repressive social order. 
This incorporation of the "negative," oppositional dimension of thought and experience 
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results in a "one-dimensional" society dominated by what Marcuse labels "technological 
rationality." 
On Marcuse's account, "technological rationality" denotes a "dimension" of 
thought by which the establishment operationalizes all aspects of material and social life; 
human relations are reduced to calculated exchanges between alienated labourer-
consumers and the value of any idea or practice is determined by its ability to contribute 
to the continued functioning of the apparatus. Although human beings have been able to 
control the forces of nature to an unprecedented extent by employing this form of 
scientific, operational thinking, technological rationality eventually functions as the 
paradigmatic mode of thought. Accordingly, the establishment that employs it either 
incorporates dissent and opposition or, if they are perceived as a threat to the system, 
dismisses them as irrational. In this regard, technological rationality "becomes the great 
vehicle of better domination, creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and 
nature, mind and body are kept in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of 
this universe."209 
In order to ensure that the individual's critical capacities are effectively 
"contained," Marcuse argues that this society also produces and endorses the 
consumption of superfluous commodities, which individuals come to internalize as their 
own needs. On this basis, he now distinguishes between "false needs" and "vital needs." 
Vital needs refer the material and social resources indispensable to the sustained 
functioning of the individual and society as such. According to Marcuse, the "only needs 
that have an unqualified claim for satisfaction are the vital ones—nourishment, clothing, 
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lodging at the attainable level of culture." Thus, "vital needs" are the "basic" 
requirements needed to sustain human life. 
This is not to suggest, however, that these basic needs for food, clothing, and 
shelter are the only needs human beings have. Indeed, the early Marx also reminds us of 
the "spiritual," or distinctly human needs that separate human beings from other animals. 
For instance, Marx describes the "objects of art" as the human being's "spiritual 
inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make palatable and 
digestible."211 Likewise, while Marcuse believes that vital needs are the only needs with 
an unqualified claim for fulfillment—that is, they must be satisfied in order to ensure our 
survival and thus require no further justification for their satisfaction—their fulfillment is 
• • 919 
also "the prerequisite for the realization of all needs." 
False needs, on the other hand, are "those which are superimposed upon the 
individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, 
aggressiveness, misery, and injustice."213 These include the "need" for mindless 
comforts, gadgets, and leisure activities created by the culture industry, the "need" to 
consume wasteful products, and so on.214 Although they might afford the individual some 
degree of pleasure, Marcuse argues that these "needs" should not be preserved if they 
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numb individuals' mental faculties and prevent them from recognizing the repressive 
character of their society.215 
Furthermore, these needs are considered "false" when they are promoted in the 
interest of limiting the greater potentialities and freedoms of human beings. In An Essay 
on Liberation, Marcuse argues that under the influence of these administered needs, 
individual autonomy "asserts itself in the right to race his automobile, to handle his 
power tools, to buy a gun, to communicate to mass audiences his opinion, no matter how 
ignorant, how aggressive, it may be." Again, some of these activities might be 
enjoyable to a certain degree, but they become "false" if they are the sole means of 
expressing individual autonomy. By identifying themselves with these prescribed needs, 
individuals become dependent upon the goods and services that promote conformity and 
submission to the repressive system. In turn, the interests of the establishment become the 
innermost drives and aspirations of the individuals. 
SECTION 2: REPRESSIVE DESUBLIMATION 
Considering both the mass dissemination of prescribed needs and the power of 
containment to neutralize the individual's critical and subversive capacities, Marcuse 
argues that the cultural and sexual spheres are now put to work in the service of the 
established order. The needs and aspirations promoted by the advanced industrial system 
shape the desires and life horizons of its citizens, thus establishing the preconditions for 
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conformity to this system. By manipulating and controlling the desires of its citizens and 
rendering all oppositional elements ineffectual, the establishment is able to grant more 
liberties than ever before. The formerly "explosive" power of the sexual instincts is 
rendered harmless by being "contained" within a system of effective controls. Thus, 
whereas Marcuse's previous work focuses on the repressive "sublimation" of the drives, 
by which instinctual aims are diverted towards non-sexual, unsatisfying labour, he now 
focuses on the ways in which the establishment enables individuals to achieve immediate 
release of instinctual urges on the basis of these new modes of manipulation and control. 
He refers to this controlled release of unrestrained sexual desires as "repressive 
desublimation." 
In "The Conquest of the Unhappy Consciousness: Repressive Desublimation," 
Marcuse illustrates his conception of "repressive desublimation" through a comparison of 
the traditional and contemporary functions of art. He turns to the "high culture" of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly the works of Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe, Gustave Flaubert, and Thomas Mann. According to Marcuse, these great figures 
were once able to achieve "artistic alienation" vis-a-vis the established bourgeois order. 
However, "artistic alienation" is not to be confused with Marx's use of this term. On 
Marx's account, alienation is a state in which the worker confronts virtually all aspects of 
his or her life activity as hostile forces operating over and against him or her. In this 
condition, the labourer is unable to achieve fulfillment from his or her labour and 
functions merely as a tool to be manipulated and employed in the interests of maximizing 
profit for a relative few. 
Idem, An Essay on Liberation, p. 12. 
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Through traditional forms of oppositional art, on the other hand, the artist is able 
to recognize the prevailing unfreedom of the given society and achieve a critical distance 
from it. "Artistic alienation," he writes, "is sublimation. It creates the images of 
conditions which are irreconcilable with the established Reality Principle but which, as 
cultural images, become tolerable, even edifying and useful."217 Although this period was 
also characterized by toilsome labour, misery, and inequality, these artists were able to 
transcend the oppressive order by offering images that represented the antithesis of 
alienated social life: "such disruptive characters as the artist, the prostitute, the adulteress, 
the great criminal and outcast," and so on.218 These images pointed beyond the 
established society and represented a rebellion against the prevailing alienation that 
characterized these times. 
Under the advanced industrial apparatus, artistic creation loses its power to 
negate the established reality principle by virtue of its containment within this system. 
The previously antagonistic artistic images are transformed into "the national hero, the 
beatnik, the neurotic housewife, the gangster, the star," none of which point beyond the 
current civilization.219 These images no longer pose a threat to the established society 
because their previously antagonistic elements have been assimilated to the system in 
which they are manufactured and sold. Indeed, the fact that these images often 
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"contradict the society which sells them does not count," since they have been made to 
operate in the service of the established order.220 
On Marcuse's account, the oppositional elements in the "higher culture" are 
succumbing to the "process of desublimation which prevails in the advanced regions of 
contemporary society."221 Most of its images no longer evoke forgotten truths and higher 
ideals, but express the immediate ideals and interests of the prevailing social forces. 
Whereas previous artistic creation demanded time, energy, and critical thought in order to 
apprehend the underlying truths and messages conveyed in the work, contemporary art is 
largely transformed into entertainment and treated as a "passive" leisure activity. We can 
observe these tendencies even more clearly in the present age, where film is being 
converted into big-budget Hollywood movies endorsing conformity and the pursuit of 
money and power. The mass media also displays images of substance-abusing teenage 
celebrities on magazine covers and entertainment television programs, thus promoting 
ignorance and self-destructiveness. Cultural images no longer point to another realm 
beyond the present, but become the very ideals of the society to which they were 
originally opposed. According to Marcuse, the "assimilation of the ideal with reality 
testifies to the extent to which the ideal has been surpassed."222 
Marcuse argues that this process of repressive desublimation, "replacing mediated 
by immediate gratification," also occurs in the "sexual sphere."223 Within this sexual 
sphere, as in the realm of higher culture, Marcuse claims that repressive desublimaton 
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"operates as the by-product of the social controls of technological reality, which extend 
liberty while intensifying domination."224 On the one hand, he argues that the 
technological capacities of advanced industrial society have created improved working 
conditions, shortened working days, and a greater amount of "free" time in which the 
worker might achieve instinctual gratification. On the other hand, the manipulation of the 
individual's socio-cultural life ensures that this worker's instinctual drives are efficiently 
coordinated and determined by the prevailing interests in domination. As a result, this 
society can "grant more than before because its interests have become the innermost 
drives of its citizens, and because the joys which it grants promote social cohesion and 
contentment."225 Thus, sexuality becomes "liberalized" in the sense that it has been made 
amenable to social and political manipulation and can express itself "freely" only on this 
basis. 
As I argued in the last chapter, Marcuse attempts to envisage a world in which 
sexuality would be transformed into Eros. Rather than being pressed exclusively into the 
service of procreation and "part-time" fulfillment, the life instincts would create an order 
of gratification in which individuals would be able to achieve lasting instinctual 
satisfaction in all aspects of their lives. Under fundamentally improved social conditions, 
he claims that sexuality would undergo the process of "non-repressive sublimation," 
which would lead to higher pleasures for all zones of the body in an environment of 
freedom. Already in Eros and Civilization, however, Marcuse begins to anticipate the 
current modes of repressive desublimation that would become the subject of his later 
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thought. He writes: "the free development of transformed libido beyond the institutions of 
the performance principle differs essentially from the release of constrained sexuality 
within the dominion of these institutions."226 In the latter case, the manifestations of 
"mere sexuality" are not only rendered harmless by this society, but actually prevent the 
individual from seeking "polymorphous" modes of instinctual gratification in a 
fundamentally "eroticized" social and natural environment. 
In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse develops these earlier arguments concerning 
the environment in which the "saved" libido is able to achieve gratification.227 Again, he 
invokes past experiences of pleasure and compares them with those under present 
conditions. While he acknowledges that the pre-technological world contained "misery, 
toil, and filth," he claims that there was still "a 'landscape,' a medium of libidinal 
experience which no longer exists." On this point, he compares the act of making love 
in a meadow to making love in an automobile. In the former instance, "the environment 
partakes of and invites libidinal cathexis and tends to be eroticized. Libido transcends 
beyond the immediate erotogenic zones—a process of nonrepressive sublimation." 
Although this might seem to be an uncritical portrayal of life in the pre-technological 
world, Marcuse is emphasizing the point that our technological capabilities are 
"contained" within this system. While these technological forces could serve to beautify 
the natural and social environment and intensify the overall experience of pleasure, they 
are increasingly pressed into the service of wasteful production and the destruction of the 
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natural world. Thus contained, these technical capacities create a "mechanized 
environment" that precludes the "self-transcendence of libido."230 
Furthermore, Marcuse suggests that a crucial dimension of erotic experience is 
lost in a mechanized society in which commodities mediate virtually every human 
interaction. In An Essay on Liberation, he argues that automobiles, televisions, 
"household gadgets," and other products are not necessarily repressive in and of 
themselves. Rather, they are repressive when they are "produced in accordance with the 
requirements of profitable exchange," and, in turn, "become part and parcel of the 
people's own existence, own 'actualization.'"231 Under the present conditions of 
production and consumption, these products are created in order to maximize profit for 
corporate stockholders and bind individuals to the system of repressive satisfaction. In 
turn, he concludes that individuals must now "buy part and parcel of their own existence 
on the market."232 
By purchasing the commodities necessary to complete their sexual image, 
individuals also become more efficient, attractive commodities in the labour force. In 
Eros and Civilization, Marcuse claims that "only in exceptional cases, and with a high 
degree of sublimation, are libidinal relations allowed to enter into the sphere of work."233 
At this point, he extends his critique to the methods of containment and repressive sexual 
liberty within the work world itself. "Without ceasing to be an instrument of labor," he 
writes, "the body is allowed to exhibit its sexual features in the everyday work world and 
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in work relations." Indeed, sex-appeal is often considered to be a prerequisite for job 
success, particularly in the service industry, the mass media, and certainly in the sex 
trade. However, this "body" is only allowed to express its sexual features in work 
relations after the beauty industry and other societal apparatuses have moulded the 
individual to conform to prevailing standards of attractiveness. 
Insofar as individuals conduct their labour for an apparatus that they do not 
control, their work remains alienating. However, since the work world now consists of a 
more attractive, marketable labour force, the work relations themselves appear to be more 
gratifying.235 Since the repressive character of this labour is masked by its attractive 
appearance, the workers come to identify themselves with their alienated performances. 
Marcuse recognizes that "no matter how much it may serve as a prop for the status quo," 
this labour "is also gratifying to the managed individuals, just as racing the outboard 
motor, pushing the power lawn mower, and speeding the automobile are fun."236 The 
worker is thus preconditioned to accept the necessity of this labour despite the fact that it 
is still carried out in the interests of the system of repressive satisfaction. Accordingly, 
the individual develops what Marcuse labels a "happy consciousness." 
This notion of the "happy consciousness" is inspired by G.W.F. Hegel's 
conception of the "unhappy consciousness." In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel 
describes the unhappy consciousness as self-consciousness divided into two contradictory 
parts. On the one hand, it is "a merely empirical, confused, and transient self," bound up 
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with a world of changeable objects and individuals. On the other hand, it is "an eternal, 
rational, real self." It is thus both a "changeable and inessential" being of this world 
and an "unchangeable and essential" being connected to divine truth.238 In general terms, 
then, the unhappy consciousness is consciousness aware of its own self-contradictory 
nature: it realizes that there is divine truth and fulfillment, but it also realizes that it is 
severed from this truth and will not be able to attain it. 
On this basis, we can now begin to understand the differences between the 
unhappy consciousness and the happy consciousness. According to Marcuse, traditional 
works of literature and art reflected the unhappy consciousness of their time. Those artists 
who achieved a certain degree of critical distance from the established society were able 
to recognize the unactualized possibilities of this world and articulate those possibilities 
through their work. Prior to their containment within the advanced industrial capitalist 
system, art and literature reflected "the unhappy consciousness of the divided world, the 
defeated possibilities, the hopes unfulfilled, and the promises betrayed." In the sexual 
sphere, those individuals who were forced to sublimate their drives in accordance with 
the surplus-repressive performance principle were better able to recognize the 
contradiction that this society refused to pacify human life despite its ability to drastically 
reduce scarcity and want. In both cases, individuals were able to grasp the contradictory 
nature of their society. 
The happy consciousness, on the other hand, fails to recognize the fact that the 
potentialities in this society have been contained. The individual feels content with the 
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satisfactions he or she is granted and cannot imagine any possibilities beyond these 
satisfactions. According to Marcuse, the happy consciousness "reflects the belief that the 
real is rational, and that the established system, in spite of everything, delivers the 
goods."240 The emergence of this happy consciousness reveals the extent to which the 
established order is able to conquer all transcendent, oppositional modes of thought, 
experience, and action. In short, individuals become content in their unfreedom. 
At this point, Marcuse reveals the critical force of sublimation. When compared to 
the prevailing forms of desublimation characteristic of advanced industrial civilization, 
the "sublimated drives and objectives contain more deviation, more freedom, and more 
refusal to heed the social taboos."241 While it seems obvious that Marcuse would consider 
"non-repressive sublimation" more gratifying, life-enhancing, and oppositional when 
compared to desublimation, even the case of "repressive sublimation" seems to be more 
thoroughly oppositional than desublimation. Both of these types of sublimation would 
involve the recognition of the barriers—whether basic repressive or surplus-repressive— 
to the complete gratification of immediate instinctual strivings. "To be sure," Marcuse 
writes, "all sublimation is enforced by the power of society, but the unhappy 
consciousness of this power already breaks through alienation."242 Regardless of whether 
or not the individual is able to break through this alienation in practice, she would still 
recognize this alienation and potentially seek to overcome it. Thus, sublimation in its 
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ideal form "becomes the cognitive power which defeats suppression while bowing to 
it."243 
Considering the fact that individuals believe themselves to be perfectly free in a 
fundamentally unfree society, they no longer feel the need to sublimate their sexual 
energy. By "diminishing erotic and intensifying sexual energy," he argues, "the 
technological reality limits the scope of sublimation. It also reduces the need for 
sublimation."244 The individual's ability to achieve gratification both in and outside of the 
work place is limited to the raw, immediate satisfaction of the sexual instincts rather than 
the "fuller Eros" that Marcuse endorses. This gratification is offered as a concession in 
order to appease the masses and to keep them satisfied under alienated conditions. The 
system of controlled gratification thus appears to require less repression of the 
individual. As a result, "the tension between that which is desired and that which is 
permitted seems considerably lowered," and the worker feels affirmed in her "free" 
choices, desires, and aspirations. 
Since this society appears to "deliver the goods," Marcuse argues that it 
subsequently weakens the individual's capacity to resist the "cruel affluence" of the 
apparatus and to rebel against it. The entire realm of prescribed aspirations and needs 
"kills in its citizens the very disposition, the organs for the alternative: freedom without 
exploitation."245 Although the individual does achieve a certain degree of satisfaction 
from his or her gadgets, leisure activities, and work relations, these concessions serve to 
mask the prevailing unfreedom both within and beyond the advanced industrial societies. 
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Through various modes of relaxation and controlled satisfaction, the individual is trained 
to ignore the widespread poverty, genocides, and other systemic social problems that 
occur throughout the world. The "Great Refusal" required to challenge and overcome 
these issues is blocked through "compensation which seems more satisfying than the 
refusal."246 Thus, the controlled sexual liberties granted by the establishment conquer all 
transcendent modes of thought and action, providing "satisfaction in a way which 
generates submission and weakens the rationality of protest."247 
SECTION 3: SEXUAL LIBERALIZATION AND DESTRUCTIVENESS 
As we have seen, Marcuse believes that the desublimation of sexual energy within 
a system of effective controls does not enhance the greater potentialities of human beings. 
Rather, it limits their capacity to experience lasting instinctual gratification in an 
environment of freedom. Far from liberating the life instincts to bring about ever-greater 
unities between individuals through "self-sublimation," repressive desublimation 
liberates the unrestrained sexual instincts to pursue immediate gratification without 
regard for the well-being and fulfillment of others. Competition, aggression, and the 
individualistic pursuit of pleasure thus replace the sublimated bonds of affection, 
tenderness, and solidarity. Therefore, Marcuse argues that "we are faced with the 
contradiction that the liberalization of sexuality provides an instinctual basis for the 
repressive and aggressive power of the affluent society." 
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This correlation between the release of sexual energy and the heightening of 
aggression is a "contradiction" because it seems to challenge Freud's notion that the 
liberation of the sexual instincts would necessarily neutralize the death instincts. 
However, Marcuse argues that since the "socially permitted and encouraged release of 
libido" is that of "partial and localized sexuality, it would be tantamount to an actual 
compression of erotic energy, and this desublimation would be compatible with the 
growth of unsublimated as well as sublimated forms of aggressiveness."249 In other 
words, strengthening the "partial" sexual instincts does not liberate the power of Eros to 
bind the destructive energy of the death instincts. As such, he claims that repressive 
desublimation "would imply the possibility of a simultaneous release of repressed 
sexuality and aggressiveness."250 
On this view, society is now in a better position to satisfy the demands of the 
death instincts by channelling this aggressive energy for the purposes of dominating 
human beings and the natural world. It should be noted, however, that not all 
manifestations of destructiveness are detrimental to the material and social environment. 
Indeed, the productive achievements of human civilization rely heavily on the use of such 
energy to master the powers of nature and to construct parks, houses, buildings, and other 
life-serving products. Yet rather than bringing the death instincts into the service of 
life-sustaining production, the current establishment mobilizes the collective aggressive 
impulses against foreign nations, outsiders, and other group enemies. As long as the 
Idem, One-Dimensional Man, p. 78. 
"ibid.,p. 78. 
1
 Ibid., p. 79. 
96 
establishment continues to "deliver the goods," Marcuse believes that the majority will 
passively accept "the misdeeds of this society." 
In "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," Marcuse attempts to 
identify the emerging social trends that account for the weakening of individual 
autonomy and the widespread acceptance of the destructiveness of the advanced 
O C T 
industrial system. Elaborating upon his earlier observations in Eros and Civilization, 
he argues that the individual no longer undergoes the same process of socialization and 
development as the traditional Freudian subject. On Freud's account, the family is the 
initial site of socialization. Through the trials of the Oedipus complex, the child develops 
a superego, which influences the repressions that he or she carries out and establishes a 
mature ego. This private familial process thus equips the child with the requisite mental 
tools to handle the pressures and demands of the outside world and to eventually survive 
under the reality principle. 
Through this socialization process, "the younger generation entered societal life 
with impulses, ideas, and needs which were largely their own."254 On the basis of this 
private process of development and maturation, children develop a mature ego and 
superego which are largely independent of the societal norms and values that they will 
later confront. As such, these mature "individuals" become aware of the "irreconcilable 
conflict" between themselves and their society.255 According to Marcuse, the "individual 
remains unhappy with an unhappy consciousness," but he or she is also able to recognize 
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the authority of the given society and the need to reach compromise satisfactions in the 
face of its demands. Thus, the mature individual is able to achieve "relative autonomy" 
from the established system insofar as he or she recognizes the rift between self and 
other—individual and society—and attempts to negotiate between external demands and 
private fulfillment. 
Marcuse believes that current trends have rendered this "relatively autonomous" 
subject obsolete. On his account, the formerly private socialization of the child is now 
"being invalidated by society's direct management of the nascent ego through the mass 
media, school and sport teams, gangs, etc."256 Considering the establishment's ubiquitous 
controls over all dimensions of human life, the child is not able to develop an 
independent ego and superego outside of the established system. As such, the immature 
ego is unable to distinguish between self and other, between private fulfillment and social 
requirements. Marcuse claims that "the ego ideal is rather brought to bear on the ego 
directly and 'from outside,' before the ego is actually formed as the personal and 
(relatively) autonomous subject of mediation between himself and others."257 
Accordingly, the individual does not develop his or her own ego ideal and "conscience" 
but internalizes the societal superego directly. This process leads to the weakening of the 
individual ego, the immediate identification with group ideals, and the numbing of the 
individual's private, critical faculties of "consciousness and conscience." 
Considering the above, both the weakness of the "individual" as an autonomous 
subject and the inability of the unrestrained sexual instincts to counteract the death 
Ibid., p. 47. 
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instincts account for citizens' acceptance and perpetuation of destructiveness in the 
sexually "liberated" societies. By identifying immediately with the cultural ego-ideal, the 
individual is trained to embrace the repressive satisfaction of the sexual instincts which, 
in turn, releases destructive energy to be manipulated and employed by the establishment. 
In order to sustain itself, the prevailing system directs this aggression towards outsiders 
and enemies of the group. The societal ego-ideal "does not drive the conscience as the 
moral judge of the ego, but rather directs aggression toward the external enemies of the 
ego ideal."259 Since the demands of the "externalized," collective ego-ideal become the 
innermost drives and needs of the individual, even acts of war and genocide meet "not 
only with helpless acceptance, but also with instinctual approval on the part of the 
victims."260 
These changes in socialization and development also serve to diminish the 
individual's experience of "guilt" over the aggressive acts of his or her society. As I 
explained in Chapter 1, the sense of guilt results from a tension between the ego and the 
superego. The superego establishes "conscience," which continuously reprimands the ego 
if it does not conform to the demands of its ego-ideal. According to Marcuse, the direct 
imposition of the cultural ego-ideal upon the immature ego now weakens personal 
autonomy and diminishes the tension between the individual and society. As long as 
individuals do not transgress the demands of the cultural "fathers," they are free to 
commit destructive acts against others without experiencing guilt or remorse.261 As 
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Marcuse so forcefully asserts: "[o]ne man can give the signal that liquidates hundreds 
and thousands of people, then declare himself free from all pangs of conscience, and live 
happily ever after."262 Thus, conscience is absolved so long as the individual conforms to 
the demands of the repressive society. 
Idem, One-Dimensional Man, p. 79. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite the "obsolescence" of the Freudian subject, Marcuse argues that the 
crucial insights of psychoanalysis are not invalidated. Rather, he argues that 
"psychoanalysis draws its strength from its obsolescence: from its insistence on 
individual needs and individual potentialities which have become outdated in the social 
and political development."263 This is not to suggest, however, that Marcuse uncritically 
accepts the historical rights of the patriarchal family or the traditional formation of the 
ego-ideal. As we recall from the last chapter, Marcuse minimizes the significance of the 
Oedipus complex and refrains from offering a method of decentering infantile 
omnipotence and developing a strong superego. Yet Marcuse also argues that, for better 
or worse, the traditional family produced "individuals" capable of distinguishing between 
their own needs and desires and the repressive demands of their society. Insofar as the 
Freudian conception of the individual preserves the importance of individual autonomy 
and the development of those critical capacities necessary to question and challenge the 
established reality principle, his theory points to a lost dimension of human experience 
that must be recaptured. 
Furthermore, the prevailing "containment" of Eros and the release of unmitigated 
sexual and aggressive energy strengthens Marcuse's earlier position that a non-repressive 
civilization requires the "self-sublimation" of the life instincts. Since the "repressive 
desublimation" of "mere sexuality" prevents individuals from developing their own 
unique, life-affirming faculties and capabilities, the need to release the life instincts 
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becomes more pressing than ever before. Despite their containment in advanced 
industrial society, the radical movements of the 1960s reveal the possibility of activating 
"the elementary, organic foundation of morality in the human being," which is "perhaps 
rooted in the erotic drive to counter aggressiveness, to create and preserve 'ever greater 
unities' of life."264 In this regard, Marcuse retains his hope that the life instincts could 
potentially provide a "biological foundation for socialism," thus establishing a "sensuous 
order" wherein individuals with different needs and desires would be free to express 
themselves under fundamentally different material and social conditions.265 
Idem, An Essay on Liberation, p. 10. 264 
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CONCLUSION 
In his polemical attack against Marcuse, Alasdair Maclntyre attempts to 
invalidate his critical sexual theory on the grounds that he does not provide any positive 
"content" for a fundamentally liberated society. Maclntyre sums up this criticism in one 
crucial question, namely, "[w]hat will we actually do in this sexually liberated state?"266 
Furthermore, he claims that Marcuse's criticisms of the "monogamic, genital sexual 
culture" are meaningless unless "some contrast with what is possible but unrealized has 
been effectively delineated."267 Since he fails to address these issues, Maclntyre claims, 
Marcuse's argument is nonsensical and ineffectual. 
It is my contention that this criticism ignores the purpose and force of Marcuse's 
position by demanding that he provide "positive" content for a truly liberated society. 
Considering his commitment to radical democracy, he avoids venturing exact 
prescriptions for creating a fundamentally better world in order to open the horizon for 
collectively decided social change. What we should take from Marcuse is the value and 
critical force of what he calls "negative thinking," and the role that philosophy as 
"critique" can play in diagnosing exigent social problems with the view of overcoming 
the repressive organization of human life. 
In the final pages of An Essay on Liberation, Marcuse claims that "[n]egative 
thinking draws whatever force it may have from its empirical basis: the actual human 
condition in the 'given' society, and the 'given' possibilities to transcend this condition, 
Alasdair Maclntyre, Marcuse (London: Fontana, 1970) p. 47. 
Ibid. 
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to enlarge the realm of freedom." By critically reflecting upon material and social life, 
philosophy as "critique" has the power to identify "the actual human condition" as it is 
lived and felt in our civilization, while also recognizing the "damaged" conditions under 
which human beings are forced to live. It is on the basis of this recognition of unfreedom, 
injustice, and unhappiness that "emphatic" counter-concepts such as freedom, justice, and 
happiness can be formulated, even if we do not yet know the precise form our freedom 
and happiness will take. This formation of emphatic concepts—which arise as the 
antithesis of the given reality—constitutes the properly critical dimension of philosophy 
as critique. 
Marcuse recognizes both the prevailing unfreedom associated with the current 
liberalization of sexuality, as well as the inherent possibility within this society to 
drastically reduce material scarcity, to minimize painful physical labour, and to enable 
individuals to determine their own erotic horizons beyond the system of repressive 
satisfaction. Yet, against Maclntyre, it is not necessarily the task of critique to offer an 
exact map of a better world. With regards to such demands that all criticism be 
"constructive," or positive, Adorno writes: "The insinuation is that only someone can 
practice critique who can propose something better than what is being criticized....By 
making the positive a condition for it, critique is tamed from the beginning and loses its 
vehemence."269 The task of critique is to identify contradictions and falsities within 
material and social life in order to open the horizon for collectively organized social 
change. In this light, Adorno concludes his essay "Critique" with the claim that "the 
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false, once determinately known and precisely expressed, is already an index of what is 
right and better."270 
In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse echoes Adorno's focus on the power of 
"negative thinking" when he claims that universal, "emphatic" concepts "conceptualize 
the stuff of which the experienced world consists, and they conceptualize it with a view 
of its possibilities, in the light of their actual limitation, suppression, and denial."271 Far 
from prescribing acceptable desires, aspirations, or precise courses of political action, 
Marcuse's diagnosis of the repression of sexuality under advanced industrial civilization 
is intended to create the opening for a new social consciousness which will lead to more 
autonomous, pleasurable forms of thought and experience. 
This non-repressive civilization would consist of individuals who are able to think 
critically about their instinctual needs and desires with a view of what they could become 
if the "damaged" conditions under which they have been repressed were fundamentally 
779 
changed. Marcuse's critique seeks to indict the repressive affluence of late capitalism 
in order to envisage a world in which free individuals determine their own pleasures, and 
"really exist as individuals, each shaping his [or her] own life; they would face each other 
with truly different needs and truly different modes of satisfaction—with their own 
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refusals and their own selections." 
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